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BOSNIA AND THE LIMITATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
The demise of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe1 has
proven as troublesome as it has fruitful.2 With the relaxation
of control has come the rise of ethnic conflicts.3 Yugoslavia
1. See Francis X. Clines, The End of the Soviet Union, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
1991, at Al.
2. See generally Anthony Clark Arend, The United Nations and the New
World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 491 (1993) (assessing UN's role in the new world
order); Jane Hall, Q & A with Christiane Amanpour, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 1993,
at Fl (CNN's ongoing correspondent in Bosnia, Christiane Amanpour, reflect-
ing on the confusion in Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union); Roma
Ihnatowycz, Ukraine Has Stake in Russia Victory over Parliament, UPI, Oct. 5,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File (Ukrainian Foreign Min-
istry hopes that "Western leaders [will] see the necessity of filling the security
vacuum that was left in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union");
Howard LaFranchi, Heady Talk of European Unity Subsides in Era of Bosnia,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 30, 1993, at 1 (stating that the fall of Soviet
Union and war in Bosnia essentially puts an end to hopes of European union);
National Public Radio Broadcast (Mar. 6, 1993) (reporting that the fall of Soviet
Union has resulted in ethnic splintering, including a war in Georgia, an ex-
Soviet Union republic).
3. See supra note 2; see also Peter S. Green, UPI, Feb. 24, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File (reporting ethnic tensions in Czechoslova-
kia); Jane Perlez, The World: Visions of the Past Are Competing for Votes in
Poland, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1993, § 4, at 5 (Vaclav Havel, the Czech Presi-
dent, recently observed that "the removal of Communism's 'vast shroud of uni-
formity' was bringing an 'eruption of so many different kinds of old-fashioned
patriotism, revivalist messianism, conservatism, and expressions of hatred' in
Eastern Europe"); Hungarian's Attack on Opponents Sets off Storm, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 1992, § 1, at 8 (center-right ruling party leader in Hungary cites " 'ge-
netic reasons for deterioration'" of Hungary); Adam Lebor, Hungary: Political
and Ethnic Differences Creating Social Unrest, Inter Press, Feb. 1, 1992, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File (Hungarian member of parliament
indicates that "[slerious ethnic conflicts are likely because of Hungary's growing
economic problems and the increase in racism"); Romanian Leader Says Hun-
gary Foments Ethnic Strife, Reuters, Oct. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Currnt File (President of Romania, Ion Iliescu, states that transition
from Communism has resulted in ethnic strife both within Romania and be-
tween Romania and Hungary); Peter Humphrey, 50,000 Romanians Join Oppo-
sition Election Rally, Reuters, Sept. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Currnt File (fearing that ethnic Hungarians may attempt to sever
Transylvania from Romania); Vladimir Zhelyazkov, Ethnic Strife Could Endan-
ger Democracy in Bulgaria, President Says, UPI, Nov. 3, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File (president of Bulgaria warning that
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has suffered tremendously from the civil war that began
when the Yugoslav army, under Serbian control, attacked the
Slovenian militia in June of 1991.' In its course, the conflict
has sharply divided the diverse population of the republic of
Bosnia-Hercegovina. 5 Muslims, Serbs, and Croats have
struggled to invest themselves with their own ethnically de-
fined autonomy. 6 The Bosnian Serbs, backed by the inheri-
tors of the Yugoslav army, Serbia, have grabbed most of the
embattled republic, if not the sympathy of the world.' The
resolution of the conflict, although closely managed by the In-
ternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY),
may be guided by the inescapable fact that the Serbs have
been the victors of the war.8 Principles of international law
must be set aside in order to stop the fighting as soon as pos-
sible.9 Bosnia will be fortunate to survive intact.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Present Status of Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia 10 was a leading non-aligned Communist
state" when the Communist regimes of Europe began to top-
"'[e]thnic egoism and the nationalistic political propaganda of certain parties
are creating a real threat of an ethnic crisis which would endanger our country
and its fragile democracy' "); Tony Barber, Row Over Albania's Greek Minority
Fuels Balkan Flames, THE INDEPENDENT (London), July 12, 1993, at 10 (describ-
ing ethnic unrest in Albania, as Greek separatists clamor to be united with
Greece); Judy Dempsey, Communists Stumble on the Road to Reform, FIN.
TIMES (London), Jan. 3, 1991, at 2 (describing post-Communism ethnic unrest
in Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia).
4. See MIsHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA 89-90 (1992); see also dis-
cussion infra part II.A.
5. See discussion infra part II.A.
6. See discussion infra part II.A.
7. See infra text accompanying note 105 and discussion infra part II.A.3.
8. See discussion infra parts II.A.3, III.A., and IV.
9. See discussion infra part III.A.
10. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) had six provinces
(Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia)
as well as two Socialist Autonomous Provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina).
BRANKA MAGAS, THE DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA 16-17 (1993). Kosovo and
Vojvodina are now part of Serbia. Id. See also infra text accompanying note 83.
11. GORDON C. McDONALD ET AL., AREA HANDBOOK FOR YUGOSLAVIA 282-83
(1973). Tito, having developed the non-alignment concept, convened the first
Conference of Non-Aligned States in Yugoslavia's capital of Belgrade in 1960.
Id. at 282. See also ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN, YUGOSLAVIA AND THE NONALIGNED
WORLD (1970) (providing an overview of the development and practice of non-
alignment by Yugoslavia).
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ple one by one in 1989.12 Created as a single nation for the
first time after the First World War, 3 Yugoslavia was held
together following the Second World War by the single per-
sona of Tito. 14 After his death in 1980, the ethnic divisions
within Yugoslavia that Tito had managed so well began to
destabilize the country.' 5 Serbia, the dominant republic in
Yugoslavia, sought to force the maintenance of the federal
system,' 6 and with this final squeeze of federal power, Slove-
nia and Croatia slipped away. 17 Macedonia also became
more or less autonomous.'" Bosnia-Hercegovina, on the other
hand, did not have a clear ethnic majority like the other re-
publics, and its future became somewhat uncertain. 19 Only
forty-four percent of the population are Muslims, whereas
thirty-one percent are Serbs and nineteen percent are
Croats.20 Thus, Bosnia does not represent a single ethnicity,
as do the other republics. The ethnic Serbs and Croats in
Bosnia decided that they wanted to either join their regions
of Bosnia to Serbia and Croatia, respectively, or to obtain al-
most complete ethnic autonomy within Bosnia.2 ' Bosnian
12. See GLENNY, supra note 4, at 177; see also generally Meriel Beattie,
Bulgaria's Leaders Promise Free Elections, No Party Monopoly, Reuters, Dec.
12, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Archiv File (fall of Communism in
Bulgaria); Michael Wise, Once-Dissident Havel Inaugurated as Czechoslovak
President, Reuters, Dec. 29, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Archiv
File (fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia); Mark Heinrich, E. German Com-
munist Hierarchy Quits; Honecker Ousted from Party, Reuters, Dec. 3, 1989,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Archiv File (fall of Communism in East Ger-
many); David Lewis, Hungarian Prime Minister Presides over Quiet Revolution,
Reuters, Nov. 23, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Archiv File (fall of
Communism in Hungary); Andrew Tarnowski, Poland Becomes Democracy,
Strips Communists of Leading Role, Reuters, Dec. 30, 1989, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Archiv File (fall of Communism in Poland); Ceausescu Over-
thrown, Flees by Helicopter, Reuters, Dec. 22, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Archiv File (demonstrating the fall of Communism in Romania).
13. See discussion infra part II.A.1.
14. MAGAS, supra note 10, at 26-27. Tito led the partisans to victory in Yu-
goslavia during World War II, simultaneously achieving independence and a
socialist state. Id. at 79. He ruled Yugoslavia continuously until his death in
1980. Id. at 77.
15. Id. at xii-xiii.
16. GLENNY, supra note 4, at 42.
17. Id. at 96-97.
18. 300 U.S. Troops in Macedonia to Try to Contain Balkan War, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 1993, at A10.
19. MAGAS, supra note 10, at 18.
20. 365 Days in Yugoslavia, CHRISTLAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 10, 1992, at 20.
21. Peace in the Hands of Unpeaceful Serbs, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 1993,
at 41, 41-42. Bosnian Croat forces are managed by the Croatian Defense Coun-
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Serbs and Croats did not wish to be ruled by the Muslim plu-
rality.2 2 Indeed, Serb and Muslim antagonism dates back at
least to the fourteenth century.23
Unfortunately, the three ethnic groups in Bosnia were
intermingled throughout the republic.2 4 Hence, no clear lines
could be drawn. Serbs sought to connect their areas by force,
and the Croats followed suit.25 The Muslims were placed in a
primarily defensive position, and the Serbs never lost their
momentum. 26 In an effort to legitimize and support the be-
sieged Bosnian government in Sarajevo, Bosnia was officially
recognized as an independent state and was admitted as a
member of the United Nations (UN).27 This diplomatic effort
and the presence of UN troops,28 however, have contributed
very little to a definitive solution to the problem.
Since the war began in 1991, no republic in Yugoslavia
suffered more greatly than Bosnia-Hercegovina.29 While the
war developed into an uneasy detente in the rest of what was
once Yugoslavia, the fighting in Bosnia continued as fiercely
as ever." There have been a variety of cease-fires, plans, and
cil, which in turn is controlled by the Croatian government in Zagreb. GLENNY,
supra note 4, at 159. Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, has
directed Bosnian Serb forces throughout the conflict. Id. at 154, 167-68.
22. GLENNY, supra note 4, at 154-55, 163.
23. See discussion infra part II.A.1.
24. GLENNY, supra note 4, at 146-47.
25. Id. at 163, 167. The Bosnian Serbs launched their offensive after the
referendum for Bosnian independence was passed on March 1, 1992. Id. at 162-
68. In the referendum, although only 64.8% of the Bosnian population voted,
99% voted in favor of independence. 365 Days in Yugoslavia, supra note 20, at
20. The Croats in Bosnia, especially those in the West, fought a vicious battle
for territory against the Serbs, often aided by Muslim forces. GLENNY, supra
note 4, at 164.
26. Bosnia's Dismal Endgame, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 1993, at 45.
27. See discussion infra part II.A.2.
28. See Nikola Gurovic, UN Troops Arrive to Protect Sarajevo Airport, UPI,
July 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
29. Kurt Schork, Bosnian President Gives Vance-Owen Plan High Marks,
Reuters, May 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File. As of
July 5, 1993, the British Broadcasting Corporation reported that 139,000 Bosni-
ans were either dead or missing since the war began. Croatian Radio: Latest
Casualty Figures for Bosnia-Hercegovina (BBC World Broadcasts, July 5,
1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
30. See Ex-Yugoslavia: The Fight Goes on, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 26, 1992,
at 54; Paul Holmes, Bosnia Leaders Agree Constitutional, Truce Accords,
Reuters, July 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File; Paul
Holmes, Muslim, Serb Offensives Threaten Peace Talks, Reuters, Aug. 2, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
promises, but a resolution of the conflict remains beyond the
horizon.3 '
1. The Origin of Bosnia
After Roman influence in the Balkans waned in the fifth
century, many different groups controlled Yugoslavia. In the
sixth century, however, the Slavs settled the region.3 2 Appar-
ently forced to flee from Eastern Europe, they acquired what
was then known as Illyria by 650 AD. 33 The Slav settlers,
even then, were divided into three distinct groups: Croats,
Serbs, and Slovenes. 34 The Slovenes and Croats became Ro-
man Catholic, while the Serbs became Orthodox.35 Serbo-
Croat is spoken by the Serbs and Croats, but the two groups
use different alphabets.36 The Slovenes have their own
language.37
Settled by Croats and Serbs, Bosnia did not have a
strong identity until the end of the twelfth century. 38 The
conflict between the members of the Roman Catholic Church
and those of the Eastern Orthodox Church was later com-
pounded by the addition of a third group, the Bogomils, who
splintered off from the Roman Catholic Croats. 39 A peculiar
Christian sect, the Bogomils completely shunned the mate-
31. See Eduardo Cue, Decision on Bosnia Could Mark Turning Point for
NATO, EC, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 9, 1993, at 3; Morning Edition: Bos-
nian Airstrike Idea "Painted" by International Bureaucracies (National Public
Radio broadcast, Aug. 13, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt
File.
32. H.C. Darby, Historical Origins, in A SHORT HISTORY OF YuGosLAVIA 8,
8-11 (Stephen Clissold ed., 1968).
33. Id. at 11. Nearly all but the far eastern portions of Yugoslavia, as well
as Albania, constitute ancient Illyria. Id. See also McDONALD ET AL., supra
note 11, at 26-27.
34. Darby, supra note 32, at 11.
35. Id. Religion has been an essential factor in the history of Yugoslavia,
and of Bosnia in particular; lines were drawn on the basis of religion resulting
in the present seemingly unresolvable schisms between Muslims, Orthodox
Serbs, and Catholic Croats. See infra text accompanying notes 39-59.
36. Darby, supra note 32, at 11. The Serbs use the Cyrillic alphabet,
whereas the Croats use the Latin alphabet. Id.
37. Id. Slovene is quite distinct from Serbo-Croat, and is probably most
similar to Slovak. E. GARRISON WALTERS, THE Other Europe: Eastern Europe to
1945, at 19 (1988).
38. H.C. Darby, Bosnia and Hercegovina, in A SHORT HISTORY OF YUGOSLA-
vIA: FROM EARLY TIMES TO 1966, supra note 32, at 58 [hereinafter Darby, Bos-
nia and Hercegovina].
39. Id. at 58-59. This heretical Christian cult arose in the twelfth century.
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rial world.4 ° Surprisingly, this religion became widespread
at all social levels. 4' Strong Bosnian leaders, interspersed
with foreign domination by Serbia, Croatia, and Hungary,
characterized Bosnia in the Middle Ages.42 King Tvrtko of
Bosnia (1353-1391), backed by Hungary, eventually became
King of Serbia and Croatia as well, bringing Bosnia to the
peak of its power.43 He defeated Turkish invasion attempts
in both 1386 and 1388. 44 But in 1389, the Turks were better
prepared, and they defeated the combined forces of the Bosni-
ans and Serbs in the Battle of Kosovo.45 Bosnia slipped into
chaos until Turkish rule was finally assured when the last
Bosnian king, Stefan Tomasevic, was captured and executed
by the Turks in 1463.46 One of the most enduring effects of
the Turkish capture of Bosnia was the conversion of the
Bogomils to Islam.47 Apparently, the converts were some of
the more zealous members of the Islamic faith, outdoing the
religious fervor of their converters. 48 Thus the three groups
present today in Bosnia-Croats, Serbs, and Muslims-were
in place by the fifteenth century.49 The Turks primarily used
the converted Bogomils in local administrative posts, embed-
ding the Muslims in the governance of the province.50 As a
result, Catholicism nearly died out under Turkish rule, leav-
40. Id.
41. Id. at 59.
42. Id. at 59-60.
43. Id. at 60-62.
44. Ivan Bozic, The Balkan World During the Turkish Conquests, in His-
TORY OF YUGOSLAVIA 113, 115-16 (Marie Longyear ed. & Kordija Kveder trans.,
1974).
45. Id. at 116. The battle remains an ethnic rallying point for present-day
Serbs. GLENNY, supra note 4, at 34.
46. Bozic, supra note 44, at 118-19; Ivan Bozic, The Establishment of Turk-
ish Power, in HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 44, at 127, 131-32; Darby,
Bosnia and Hercegovinia, supra note 38, at 62-63.
47. Darby, Bosnia and Hercegovinia, supra note 38, at 63.
48. Darby offers the following description of the converts:
While keeping their own language, they imitated the dress, the titles
and many of the customs of the Turkish court; "they displayed the cus-
tomary zeal of converts and out-Ottomaned the Ottomans in their reli-
gious fanaticism," and indeed they became, at times, "keener in the
cause of Islam than the Commander of the Faithful himself."
Id. at 64 (quoting W. MILLER, ESSAYS ON THE LATIN ORIENT 494-95 (1921)).
49. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39, 47.
50. FRED SINGLETON, TWENTIETH-CENTURY YUGOSLAVIA 37 (1976). Conse-
quently, the period of Turkish domination does not have exclusively negative
connotations in Bosnia as it does in the rest of Yugoslavia. Id.
1044 [Vol. 34
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ing Muslims and Serbs as the primary occupants of the
country.51
Turkey ruled Bosnia for nearly 500 years, but after Tur-
key lost a number of wars to Austria, Bosnia became an in-
dependent state in 1878.52 The control of Bosnia, however,
was merely transferred from the Ottoman Empire to the Aus-
tro-Hungarian Empire.5 3 Under the Catholic Austrian ad-
ministrators, the Orthodox Serbs were continually perse-
cuted, resulting in the migration of Bosnian Serbs to
Serbia.54 Thus, as the Croats had been forced out by the
Turks, and the Serbs by the Austrians, the Muslims consti-
tuted an increasingly large proportion of the Bosnian popula-
tion. 5  By 1910, the Serbs accounted for forty-four percent of
Bosnia, the Muslims thirty-two percent, and the Croats
twenty-three percent.56 The Muslims overtook the Serbs as
the plurality in the 1971 census, with forty percent of the to-
tal population, as opposed to thirty-seven percent for the
Serbs and twenty-one percent for the Croats.57 In 1908, Aus-
tria officially annexed Bosnia, angering all three groups in
51. Darby, Bosnia and Hercegovina, supra note 38, at 65.
52. Id. at 66.
53. Id. at 68-69. When Serbs and Croats in Bosnia began to rebel against
the Turks in 1875, other Balkan Slavs under Turkish domination followed suit.
WALTERS, supra note 37, at 73. As Russia, the self-styled protector of the Slavs
in the Balkans, edged nearer to waging a war against the Turks, Austria-Hun-
gary understandably became nervous. Id. If Russia were to unify the Slavs in
the region and push the Turks out of Europe, the balance of power would shift
against the Austro-Hungarians. Id. Therefore, the Dual Monarchy of Austria-
Hungary persuaded Russia to agree not to create a new large Slavic state in the
Balkans (namely a gigantic Bulgaria) and to hand Bosnia-Hercegovina over to
Austria-Hungary. Id.
Russia won the 1877-1878 war and was so enthusiastic that, in the Russo-
Turkish Treaty of San Stefano (1878), Russia declared that there would be a
new large Slavic state and that Bosnia would become independent. Id. at 74;
SINGLETON, supra note 50, at 38. This action was unacceptable to the Austrians
as well as to the British. WALTERS, supra note 37, at 74. Ultimately, Germany
convened a conference six months later in 1878 to revise the treaty, resulting in
a restoration of the original agreement between Austria-Hungary and Russia.
SINGLETON, supra note 50, at 38. Bulgaria was scaled back in size, and Bosnia
was occupied by the Austrians. WALTERS, supra note 37, at 74. Thus, instead of
becoming autonomous, Bosnia continued to be the property of an empire, albeit
a different one.
54. Darby, Bosnia and Hercegovina, supra note 38, at 69-72. Additionally,
many Serbs left Bosnia to fight for Serbia and Montenegro during the Balkan
Wars of 1912-13. SINGLETON, supra note 50, at 58.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 51, 54.
56. SINGLETON, supra note 50, at 58 n.73.
57. Id. at 236-37.
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the process.5 8 In 1914, amid the confusion arising from the
Serbs wanting to join Serbia, the Croats wanting to join Croa-
tia, and the Muslims fearing both, a Bosnian revolutionary
assassinated the heir to the Austrian throne, and the First
World War became inevitable.59
After the war and the demise of Austria-Hungary, the
status of Yugoslavia became an open question-one that was
resolved in favor of independence. 60 The Kingdom of Yugo-
slavia was formed in 1918 and at first was considered the
successor to the State of Serbia.61 During the Second World
War, Germany conquered Yugoslavia and divided it among
Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Germany. 62 The occupiers
joined Bosnia with parts of Croatia to form the theoretically
autonomous "Independent State of Croatia," which in effect
was under Axis control.63 Since World War II, Yugoslavia
58. Id. at 58. Bosnian Serbs considered the official annexation to be noth-
ing less than an act of aggression against Serbia; the rejection of Turkish claims
to Bosnia outraged the Bosnian Muslims; and the Catholic Croats did not desire
further Germanic influences in the region. Id.
59. Darby, Bosnia and Hercegovina, supra note 38, at 72; McDONALD ET
AL., supra note 11, at 38-39. Although the complex origins of the First World
War are beyond the scope of this comment, the assassination was the pretext
that Austria had been waiting for to declare war on Serbia. MARC FERRO, THE
GREAT WAR 39-40 (Ark Paperbacks 1987) (1969). Austria sent Serbia an ulti-
matum phrased in such a way that no governmenrt could accept it. Id. at 40.
Nonetheless, Serbia agreed to all the terms except one-placing the adminis-
tration of Serbia under Austrian control. Id. at 41-42. Upon receipt of this re-
fusal, Austria promptly declared war on Serbia. Id. at 42. Consequently, Rus-
sia began to mobilize to protect Serbia, and soon all of Europe was at war. Id.
at 43-45.
60. H.C. Darby & R.W. Seton-Watson, The Formation of the Yugoslav State,
in A SHORT HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA: FROM EARLY TIMES TO 1966, supra note 32,
at 154, 162-69. Alexander Karadjordjevic, in the capacity of regent for his fa-
ther, King Peter of Serbia, declared Yugoslavian independence on December 1,
1918. SINGLETON, supra note 50, at 66. The Allies at Versailles ensured the
formation of the new state. Id. A multitude of border disputes were resolved by
1924. Id.
61. 2 D.P. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAw AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 378-79 (C.J. Hamson & R.Y. Jennings
eds., 1967). Only Serbia had been an independent state before World World I;
the remainder of Yugoslavia had been controlled by Austria-Hungary to vary-
ing extents. H.C. Darby, Serbia, in A SHORT HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA: FROM
EARLY TIMES TO 1966, supra note 32, at 87, 124-25; SINGLETON, supra note 50,
at 66-67. Furthermore, a Serbian King ruled all of Yugoslavia upon indepen-
dence. McDONALD ET AL., supra note 11, at 43.
62. 1 O'CONNELL, supra note 61, at 214. For a map of the division, see SIN-
GLETON, supra note 50, at 87.
63. Stephen Clissold, Occupation and Resistance, in A SHORT HISTORY OF
YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 32, at 208-11.
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has remained independent, and its borders have been
respected.64 The republics are so eager to secure their inde-
pendence at last that they will do nearly anything to grab as
much territory as possible while borders remain somewhat
vague.65
2. Simmering Ethnic Tensions: The New States
As the world's relations become more interwoven and the
world's economies grow even more mutually dependent, orga-
nizations such as the United Nations gain tremendously in
significance.66 Accordingly, international law has assumed
greater authority and responsibility, and an international or-
der is growing in significance. 67 With the end of the U.S.-
64. Black History, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 22, 1992, at 36.
65. See Peace in the Hands of Unpeaceful Serbs, supra note 21, at 41; see
also discussion infra part II.A.2. Since the breakdown of the federal system in
Yugoslavia, the boundaries between the republics have not been respected. See
supra text accompanying notes 21-25. Under the guise of self-determination,
Serbs and Croats especially have attempted to alter the borders of Serbia and
Croatia, depending upon where Serbs and Croats happen to live. Id.; see also
discussion infra part III.B.
66. The Economist has reported that:
Today's economies are interdependent. Flows of trade and capital tie
countries more closely together than at any time since the 19th cen-
tury. A recession in one country slows growth elsewhere; one govern-
ment's budget deficit draws resources not just from domestic savings
but from a global pool of capital that all have to share.
The Perils of Togetherness, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1991, at 15; see also David
Wessel, World's Economies, Now Interdependent, All Suffer Together, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 17, 1992, at Al (stating that interdependence of global economy results
in concurrent slumps); Michael Kranish, Clinton Sees Broad Steps but No Pacts
at Summit, BOSTON GLOBE, July 6, 1993, at 1 (quoting President Clinton: "'This
new global economy is here to stay .... We can't wish it away. We can't run
from it. We can't build walls around our nation.' "); Amy Kaslow, U.S.-French
Squabble Threatens to Derail World Trade Deal, CHRISTLIA ScI. MONITOR, Sept.
30, 1993, at 9 (statement by EC Trade Commissioner Leon Britten) (cautioning
Europe not to ignore the "increasingly interdependent world economy"); Order
in Own House Best Basis for Cooperation, Reuters, Apr. 28, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File (statement by German Bundesbank presi-
dent Helmut Schlesinger) (reporting:" '[it is a fact that Germany and the Euro-
pean Community are acting under complex national and regional conditions,
... [b]ut they are at the same time tied into an increasingly interdependent
global economy' "); Peter Norman, Getting Their Breath Back, FIN. TIMES
(London), May 26, 1993, at 1 (noting that global foreign exchange turnover has
tripled in the three largest markets in the last six years). See also generally
Arend, supra note 2 (exploring the UN's possible roles in an era of
multilateralism).
67. See John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, International Law and Institu-
tions for a New Age, 81 GEO. L.J. 535, 535 (1993). "The United Nations... may
now be taking on new roles of unparalleled significance, as illustrated by its
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Soviet conflict, which previously colored all international re-
lations, countries are more willing to place their troubles and
conflicts within the powers of the UN, the European Commu-
nity (EC), and other international bodies, such as the Inter-
national Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.6 8 The inter-
national authority overseeing the negotiations, the
activities in the Persian Gulf, Cambodia, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia."
Id. The authors also evaluate the growing power of international law itself:
There is now a complex mix of international and domestic law, admin-
istered and enforced by a variety of entities and often invoked by indi-
viduals. This new law builds on a variety of shared interests, well be-
yond traditional international reciprocity. It forms an international
legal network complementing other networks-economic, communica-
tions, and family-that are increasingly integrating the world.
Id at 549.
68. The European Community established the International Conference on
the Former Yugoslavia, including an Arbitration Commission, by a declaration
on August 27, 1991:
"The [European] Community and its member States cannot stand
idly by as the bloodshed in Croatia increases day by day. An agree-
ment on the monitoring of the cease-fire and its maintenance should
allow the Community and its member States to convene a peace confer-
ence and establish an arbitration procedure."
"The arbitration procedure in the framework of this peace confer-
ence will be established as follows. The relevant authorities will sub-
mit their differences to an Arbitration Commission of five members
chosen from the Presidents of the Constitutional Courts existing in the
Community countries. The composition of the Arbitration Commission
will be:
two members appointed unanimously by the Federal Presidency
[of Yugoslavia]
three members appointed by the community and its member
States
In the absence of agreement on the members to be appointed by
the Federal Presidency, they will be appointed by the three members
appointed by the Community.
This Arbitration Commission will give its decision in two months."
Memorandum from the Steering Committee of the International Conference on
the Former Yugoslavia app. I at 1 (Oct. 27, 1992) (alterations in original) (cita-
tions omitted) (quoting European Political Co-Operation Extraordinary Minis-
terial Meeting Declaration, Aug. 27, 1991) (on file with author).
The Arbitration Commission was given even broader power over the con-
flict in Yugoslavia by a subsequent European Community Declaration:
"[Tihe Community and its member States will convene under their ae-
gis a Conference on Yugoslavia in the Peace Palace in the Hague, on 7
September 1991, and at the same time set up an arbitration procedure.
In the framework of the Conference, the Chairman will transmit to
the Arbitration Commission the issues submitted for arbitration, and
the results of the Commission's deliberations will be put back to the
Conference through the Chairman. The rules of procedure for the arbi-
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Conference, which includes its own Arbitration Commission,
has attempted to restore peace to war-torn Yugoslavia.69 The
Conference is a true breakthrough in international law be-
cause of its step-by-step conflict resolution process.70 The
Conference has been unable to put a definitive end to the hos-
tilities in Yugoslavia, but the scope of its objectives suggests a
potentially broader significance. 71 The European resolution
of conflicts by the initially EC-sponsored conference is akin to
a jury trial on an international level, with a jury composed of
one's regional peers.72 Within this context, the obligations of
international law have become ever more meaningful.73
Although many violations of the rules of war have occurred in
tration will be established by the Arbitrators, taking into account ex-
isting organisations in that field."
Id. at 2 (citations omitted) (quoting European Political Co-Operation Extraordi-
nary Ministerial Meeting Declaration, Sept. 3, 1991). Although the Arbitration
Commission may explicitly establish its own procedural rules, there is no men-
tion of what substantive law should be applied. Presumably, then, the Arbitra-
tion Commission is expected to apply "principles of public international law."
Arbitration Commission Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 1, 1 (Nov. 29,
1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter Opinion No. 1]. For a discussion of the
sources of international law, see discussion infra part II.B.2.
The Conference was initially chaired by Lord Carrington. Sarah Helm,
Lord Carrington's Appointment Wins Swift Backing, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Sept. 4, 1991, at 8. On October 8, 1991, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations involved the UN in the peace process by naming former U.S.
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as a special envoy. UN Chief Names Cyrus
Vance Personal Envoy for Yugoslavia, Reuters, Oct. 8, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File. On August 26, 1992, Lord Carrington re-
signed as Chairman of the Conference. Judy Dempsey & Ivo Dawney, Car-
rington Resigns as EC Peace Envoy to Yugoslavia, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug.
26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File. The following day,
the UN and the EC decided to jointly sponsor the continuing Conference, and to
establish a co-chairmanship. Alan Philps, Owen Takes Over as Peacemaker,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 28, 1992, at 1. The EC would be represented
by Lord Carrington's replacement, Lord David Owen, and the UN would be rep-
resented by Cyrus Vance. Id. See also Marc Weller, Current Developments: The
International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569, 576 (1992) (discussing the formation of the
Conference and the Arbitration Commission).
69. Weller, supra note 68, at 576-77.
70. See discussion infra part II.A.3.
71. See discussion infra part II.A.3.
72. International law at the regional level has emerged as a major source of
new rights and obligations for states; the European Community system of re-
gional rule-making is one of the best examples. See generally T.C. HARTLEY,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN ComMuNITY LAw (Tony Honore & Joseph Raz
eds., 2d ed. 1988).
73. See supra note 67.
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the fighting in Yugoslavia,74 the leaders of the republics have
at least recognized international law and have been respon-
sive to the Conference.75
Given the simmering ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia, in
hindsight it seems almost obvious that the republics would
boil over upon the disintegration of Eastern European and
Balkan central authority.76 These republics have been wait-
ing in the wings for the opportunity to break free. 77 The pro-
cess of disintegration has led to the end of Yugoslavia 78 and
the creation of at least five new states: Serbia (often acting in
ex-Yugoslavia's stead), Slovenia,79 Croatia, ° Macedonia,8 '
74. The Security Council of the United Nations requested that the Secre-
tary-General submit a proposal for an international tribunal that would prose-
cute those suspected of war crimes. UNITED NATIONS, REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL ON ASPECTS OF ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA 1 2, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993). The report outlines the basis of the
Security Council's concern:
In resolution 771 (1992) of 13 August 1992, the Security Council ex-
presses grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of
international humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the
former Yugoslavia and especially in Bosnia and Hercegovina, including
reports of mass forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians, impris-
onment and abuse of civilians in detention centres, deliberate attacks
on non-combatants, hospitals and ambulances, impeding the delivery
of food and medical supplies to the civilian population, and wanton
devastation and destruction of property. The [Security] Council
strongly condemned any violations of international humanitarian law,
including those involved in the practice of "ethnic cleansing," and de-
manded that all parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia cease
and desist from all breaches of international humanitarian law.
Id. % 6. The Security Council adopted the Secretary-General's proposal in issu-
ing Resolution 827. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
A UN refugee official noted that: " 'The difference from other conflicts I
have seen is that in Bosnia the creation of a legion of displaced persons is not
the consequence of military action but the aim of it. There are militia groups
everywhere who respect no conventions. Violations of the rules of war are sys-
tematic.'" Tony Barber, Dirty War Savages Any Hopes of Peace, THE INDEPEND-
ENT (London), May 17, 1992, at 12 (citation omitted).
75. Bosnia's Dismal Endgame, supra note 26, at 45 (reporting that Bosnia's
Muslim President, Izetbegovic, accepts partition of his country and that Bos-
nian Serb leader, Karadzic, senses that Serbs have more to gain by talking).
76. See generally discussion infra part II.A.1; Thomas M. Franck, The
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 55 (1992).
77. See discussion supra part II.A.1.
78. See generally Opinion No. 1, supra note 68, % 3.
79. Arbitration Commission Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No.7 (Jan.
11, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Opinion No. 7].
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and Bosnia.8 2 Although the Arbitration Commission ruled on
July 4, 1992 that the State of Yugoslavia was extinct, the
self-styled "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (composed of Ser-
bia along with Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro) has at-
tempted to step into the shoes of the former state.8 3 The
Commission did not cite international law, but the simple
fact that the state no longer exists as an entity due to the
recognized sovereignty of its constituent provinces, the total
failure of its government, and the inability of the old Yugosla-
via to bring order to the region. 4 Serbia has been denied the
right to continue as the former Yugoslavia's UN representa-
tive,8 5 in part because of alleged human rights abuses and
86Cpossible war crimes. Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia were
admitted as UN Members on May 22, 1992.87 Macedonia was
admitted on April 8, 1993.88
Even though Bosnia has been recognized as an independ-
ent nation, there remains a possibility that it might be carved
up and divided among the warring factions.89  All three
80. Arbitration Commission on Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 5
(Jan. 11, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Opinion No. 5].
81. Greece has consistently blocked the recognition of Macedonia as an in-
dependent state because Greece claims that the name "Macedonia" is inher-
ently Greek, and thus the use of it by Macedonia would justify potential territo-
rial claims against Greece. Leonard Doyle, Community Split Over Macedonia
UN Move, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 15, 1993, at 12; Macedonia Presses
for UN Membership, Reuters, Jan. 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Currnt File. Even though Macedonia has renounced any possible territorial
claims, Greece continues to oppose recognition. Arbitration Commission Con-
ference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 6 (Jan. 11, 1992) (on file with author) (stat-
ing that Macedonia's assembly has agreed to inviolability of borders) [hereinaf-
ter Opinion No. 6]. Greece has managed to divide the EC on the question, but
Macedonia eventually was admitted to the UN with the provisional name of the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Vance, Owen Propose Plan for Mace-
donia, Agence France Presse, May 29, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Currnt File. Negotiations between Greece and Macedonia continue. Id.
82. The Bosnian Parliament declared its independence from Yugoslavia on
October 14, 1991. Opinion No. 1, supra note 68, 2.
83. Arbitration Commission Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 8 (July
4, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Opinion No. 8].
84. Id.
85. The Commission referred to UN General Assembly Resolution 757. Id.
3. See also 20'CONNELL, supra note 61, at 183 (articulating the general rule
that memberships in international organizations do not carry over to new
states).
86. See generally supra note 74 and accompanying text.
87. Opinion No. 8, supra note 83, 3.
88. Vance, Owen Propose Plan for Macedonia, supra note 81.
89. Bosnia's Dismal Endgame, supra note 26, at 45.
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groups-Serbs, Muslims, and Croats-seem intractable at
the bargaining table.90 Serbs and Croats do not want a cen-
tral government to have any authority over the areas that
they control,91 and Muslims want not only their villages back,
but also at least some form of central government.92 Bosnia
is in a precarious position. The difference between autono-
mous provinces and seceding states is small indeed. 93
3. The Division of Bosnia
The fate of Bosnia is the most prominent unresolved
question that has arisen from the war in Yugoslavia. Mus-
lims, Serbs, and Croats have fought for every inch of territory
that they have gained.94 Two major proposals for ending the
conflict have been advanced by the international mediators.
The first, aiming to divide Bosnia into ten semi-autonomous
provinces, failed in the spring of 1993.91 The second plan,
which would divide Bosnia into three nearly independent
states,96 is much more favorable to the victorious Serbs. Be-
90. For example, when the Bosnian Muslims felt that air strikes against
the Serbs were imminent in August 1993, the Muslims became more demand-
ing at the bargaining table. Id. When his escalating demands were not ac-
cepted, the Muslim leader Izetbegovic broke off talks, after which the Croat and
Serb negotiators went home. Id.; see also discussion infra part II.A.3.
91. Bosnia's Dismal Endgame, supra note 26, at 45.
92. Holmes, Bosnian Leaders Agree Constitutional, Truce Accords, supra
note 30.
93. In other words, there is hardly a distinction between fully autonomous
provinces within a single nation of Bosnia, and completely separate and in-
dependent countries within what used to be Bosnia.
94. Bosnian Serbs Report Capture of Muslim-Held Rogoj Pass and Town of
Trnovo (BBC World Broadcasts, July 13, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Currnt File; Tim Butcher, Croats' Ethnic Cleansing in Mostar, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), July 14, 1993, at 14; Alexandra Stiglmayer, Bosnia-
Hercegovina: Croat and Serb Alliance Against Muslims, Inter Press, June 10,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
95. Both the intransigence of the parties and the fact that the Serbs had
overrun many of the areas slated to be given to the Muslims doomed the ten-
province plan to failure. The Forlorn Hope, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 1993, at
17; Inside Srebrenica: City of the Damned, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 12, 1993, at 40.
Frustrated over this development, UN envoy Cyrus Vance resigned. Id. at 40.
He was replaced by Thorvald Stoltenberg, the Foreign Minister of Norway. Id.
96. The Serbs have clearly been the victors of the war: they control about
three-quarters of Bosnia, whereas the Muslim plurality holds only about 10%.
Bosnia's Dismal Endgame, supra note 26, at 45; Peace in the Hands of Un-
peaceful Serbs, supra note 21, at 41. The second plan acknowledges the Serbs'
military success, granting them more land and, very importantly, a single con-
tiguous province. Bosnia's Dismal Endgame, supra note 26, at 45; see also infra
text accompanying notes 106, 113.
cause of the strength of the Serb position in winning the war
thus far,97 it is likely that something akin to the latter propo-
sal ultimately will be adopted.
The Geneva Conference, which began on January 2,
1993, essentially resolved that Bosnia should retain its sover-
eign government.98 Similar to a confederation, the plan
sought to divide Bosnia into ten provinces, each with its own
government, police, judiciary, and schools. 99 Serbs, Muslims,
and Croats would each receive three provinces, while Sara-
jevo would remain a neutral city.1"' The provinces were not
to have separate international legal personality, dashing the
hopes of Bosnian Serbs seeking a single, unified "Greater Ser-
bia."101 The Muslim leader and current President of Bosnia,
Alija Izetbegovic, was just as apprehensive about the propo-
sal as the Bosnian Serbs.10 2 Izetbegovic did not want any rec-
ognition of ethnic conquest by the Serbs 103 or any reduction
in the central authority of the essentially Muslim
government. 104
The Serbs stood to lose the most: although they then con-
trolled nearly three-quarters of Bosnia, the plan permitted
them to retain only about half.10 5 Bosnian Serbs are espe-
cially adamant about making their provinces contiguous,
97. Bosnia's Dismal Endgame, supra note 26, at 45.
98. Peace in the Hands of Unpeaceful Serbs, supra note 21, at 41. Since
Bosnia already had been admitted as a member of the United Nations, the Con-
ference could hardly begin with the premise that Bosnia was not a state. Opin-
ion No. 8, supra note 83, 3.
99. Peace in the Hands of Unpeaceful Serbs, supra note 21, at 41.
100. Id. This power vacuum might open up Sarajevo to further hostilities,
and eventual conquest by whoever can do so, as was the fate of Jerusalem.
Although the issue is by no means settled, the UN General Assembly clearly
intended for Jerusalem to be a neutral city (i.e., to have a separate interna-
tional status) and to be administered by the UN. See W. THOMAS MALLISON &
SALLY V. MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM 229-301 (1986). But armed con-
flict broke out in 1947, and in 1948 Jerusalem was divided: Israel controlled
West Jerusalem and Jordan controlled East Jerusalem. Id. at 210-14. Israel
declared West Jerusalem its capital in 1950. Id. at 214. After the 1967 war, the
Israelis acquired the eastern portion of the city as well. Id. at 215. Israel has
subsequently declared the united Jerusalem its capital. Id. at 217.
101. Peace in the Hands of Unpeaceful Serbs, supra note 21, at 41.
102. Sid Balman Jr., Bosnian-Muslim Leader Favors Peace Plan But Serbs
Do Not, UPI, Jan. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
103. Id.
104. Bosnia-Hercegovina (BBC World Broadcasts, Jan. 18, 1993), available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
105. Peace in the Hands of Unpeaceful Serbs, supra note 21, at 41.
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with a corridor allowing them access to Serbia. 10 6 Izetbegovic
rejected any corridor scheme as offensive to Bosnian sover-
eignty. 10 7 According to the New York Times, the Bosnian
Serb leader Radovan Karadzic promised delegates of the Bos-
nian Serb assembly that ratified his signature of the plan
"that they could endorse the mediators' proposal without
abandoning their goal in the war, a separate Serbian state in
Bosnia that could later be annexed to Serbia."'0° The Serbs
were simply unwilling to compromise given their strong mili-
tary position in Bosnia; they attempted to achieve their goals
regardless of what they were forced to sign.' 0 9 Even if
Karadzic truly meant to accede to the plan's terms, it is un-
likely that the Bosnian Serbs in general would have allowed
the opportunity of obtaining better terms through military of-
fensives to slip away. 10 In any case, Karadzic clearly did not
mean to accede to the plan's terms, because he continued to
assert Bosnian Serb claims to more territory as well as to cor-
ridors even after signing the agreement."' Furthermore,
Karadzic indicated that he did not believe that the EC would
permit the Conference to fail simply because the Bosnian
Serbs disagreed about how the provinces' boundaries should
be drawn." 2 And most significantly, he said that, "we will
achieve a factual situation that will make it possible for us to
have an integrated and linked territory."1 3 Indicating an ad-
herence to the self-determination principles of Bosnian Serbs,
while ignoring the principles of continuity and the prevention
of aggression, Karadzic argued that the provinces should be
106. Bosnia-Hercegovina, supra note 104. Karadzic wanted corridors to link
Serb possessions in Bosnia and to consolidate the Bosnian Serb strategic posi-
tion. Reaction to Geneva Conference (BBC World Broadcasts, Jan. 16, 1993),
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
107. Bosnia-Hercegovina, supra note 104.
108. John F. Burns, Dim Hope for Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1993, § 1, at
5.
109. Reaction to Geneva Conference, supra note 106.
110. For example, The Economist reported that "[t]he peace map proposed by
the mediators in Geneva, Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance, returns Brcko and the
corridor to the people who used to live there. But the Serbs say that, whatever
happens in Geneva, the corridor will be theirs." Hard Men Take the Long View,
THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 16, 1993, at 48.
111. Reaction to Geneva Conference, supra note 106.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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drawn on population zones rather than antiquated bounda-
ries that no longer apply.11
4
Bosnian Serbs were given an ultimatum by the European
Community to accept the proposal without reservation.115
Although outraged by this demand,116 the Bosnian Serbs
signed it-they just did not pay any attention to it.117
The present plan to divide Bosnia into three separate
provinces under the very loose confederation of the "Union of
Republics of Bosnia and Hercegovina" would even prevent
Bosnia from having a national legislature or an army."18 The
size of these provinces, of course, is the source of the debate.
The Serbs want sixty percent of Bosnia, leaving twenty-five
percent for the Muslims and fifteen percent for the Croats. 119
The Croats want twenty percent for themselves, forty-five
percent for the Serbs, and thirty-five percent for the Mus-
lims.120 Thus, if the Serbs and Croats were to have their
way, the Muslims would be left with only twenty percent of
Bosnia even though they represent forty-four percent of its
population.' 2 ' Yet since the Muslims only control about ten
percent of the country, they are unlikely to obtain much more
than twenty percent. 122 The "map game" has continued as
fiercely as when it began in March of 1992.123 Only the close
of hostilities will bring a truly firm set of borders to Bosnia.
114. Id. Under international law, the sanctity of borders and the illegality of
territorial acquisition through aggression may supersede the right of self-deter-
mination. See discussion infra parts III.B.2-3.
115. Reaction to Geneva Conference, supra note 106.
116. Id.
117. All Things Considered: Bosnian President Appears to Be Losing Power
(National Public Radio broadcast, June 22, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, NPR File.
118. Bosnia's Dismal Endgame, supra note 26, at 45.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. The Muslims did not, however, occupy 44% of Bosnia even before the
war began, because many of them live in concentrated, urban areas such as
Sarajevo. See id.
122. Id.
123. Glenny describes the outbreak of this dilemma: "The Serbs demanded
65% of [Bosnia's] territory while the Croats wanted 35%. This left the Moslems
(who made up 44% of the population) precisely nothing.... [T]he Croats and
Serbs agreed on one formula which left the Moslems with 5% of the republic's
territory." GLENNY, supra note 4, at 163.
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B. The International Law of State Succession
The questions that arise as a consequence of the emer-
gence of a new state present clear examples of the need for
international law.12 4 What treaties and obligations are bind-
ing on new states? What portion of international law must be
adhered to by all states? The rules of state succession ad-
dress these questions, but they by no means resolve them.
1. UN Treaties
The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Re-
spect of Treaties of 1978125 is the primary international
agreement of state succession, although it is not in force. Ar-
ticle 16, the most controversial component of the treaty, per-
mits newly independent states to opt out of treaties to which
their territory was formally subject:
A newly independent state is not bound to maintain in
force, or to become a party to, any treaty by reason only of
the fact that at the date of the succession of States the
treaty was in force in respect of the territory to which the
succession of States relates.
126
This "clean slate" rule, which permits a new state to disre-
gard all treaties signed by the state that used to possess its
territory, is especially controversial. Although supported in
theory, it has yet to command the respect of state practice.
127
The other UN treaty, entitled the Vienna Convention on Suc-
cession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives, and
Debts (1983),12s has also garnered few ratifications. 129 The
124. "State succession arises when there is a definitive replacement of one
state by another in respect of sovereignty over a given territory in conformance
with international law." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 651 (3d ed. 1979). Bosnia seems to fit comfortably within the definition.
125. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug.
23, 1978, U.N. Sales No. F.79.U.10 (1979) (not in force).
126. Id. art. 16.
127. Rein Mullerson, The Continuity and Succession of States, by Reference
to the Former USSR and Yugoslavia, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 473, 474 (1993).
The treaty requires that fifteen states ratify it, but only eight have actually
done so. The United States, Russia, and all the former colonial powers refused
to ratify. D. J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 813 n.69
(4th ed. 1991). Clearly, new states favor the "clean slate" rule because it allows
them to choose whether or not to maintain existing treaties in force. Id. at 816.
The older and more powerful states, on the other hand, seek continuity of law so
that their interests may be preserved. Id.
128. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property,
Archives, and Debts, Apr. 7, 1983, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.117/14 (1983) (not in
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1983 Convention does not substantially affect the rights and
duties of states with respect to the resolution of the war in
Bosnia and is purposefully limited in scope by Article 5.130
When treaties are not widely accepted, it raises doubts as to
whether any single rule applies to the situation at all, at least
on the international level. 131
2. Sources of International Law
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice enumerates the sources of international law:
a. international conventions, whether general or partic-
ular, establishing rules expressly recognised by contesting
states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilised
nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59 [that the deci-
sions of the court are not binding on non-parties], judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.
1 32
Because there is no definitive state succession treaty, inter-
national customary law must be examined. 133 Unfortunately,
there is no consensus in customary law regarding state suc-
cession; thus, public policy may fill the vacuum-at least for
the actions of states, if not the judgments of courts.'13  A new
state will almost always find that although the law of state
succession might permit it to argue the "clean slate" rule, re-
force) [hereinafter Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State
Property].
129. See B. Graefrath, The International Law Commission Tomorrow: Im-
proving Its Organization and Methods of Work, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 595, 600-01
(1991) (stating that both Vienna Conventions on state succession do not have
support of the international community).
130. Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, supra
note 128, art. 5.
131. The absence of a treaty presently in force regarding state succession,
coupled with a lack of consistent state practice, suggests that there may be no
rule of law governing state succession. See discussion infra part II.B.2.
132. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38, 1.
133. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 57-59 (6th ed. 1963).
134. See GEORG SCIIWARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 69-71 (6th ed. 1976).
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lations with other states necessitate the continuance of
obligations.'13
Customary international law on state succession is very
much unresolved, as Brownlie notes:
State succession is an area of great uncertainty and con-
troversy. This is due partly to the fact that much of the
state practice is equivocal and could be explained on the
basis of special agreement and various rules distinct from
the category of state succession. Indeed, it is perfectly
possible to take the view that not many settled legal rules
have emerged as yet. 136
More recent commentators have suggested that portions of
the law of state succession are "clear;"137 but although it may
be clear what most states recognize, it is far less certain why
they recognize it.1 38 In other words, what is the source of this
practice? Perhaps practical considerations have funneled the
disparate aims and goals of nations into the same conclu-
sion. 13  States may act uniformly, but such consensus does
not necessarily amount to custom.' 40 If states do not feel that
they are obligated by law to act in a particular manner, then
no custom exists.
1 4
'
135. See BROWNLIE, supra note 124, at 652. Czechoslovakia discovered the
consequences of adherence to the "clean slate" rule after the First World War.
See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
136. BROWNLIE, supra note 124, at 652 (footnote omitted).
137. See, e.g., Note, Taking Reichs Seriously: German Unification and the
Law of State Succession, 104 HARv. L. REv. 588, 588-89 (1990) ("clear rules
govern both the merger of two states into a new state and the absorption of part
of one state's territory by another state" (emphasis added)) [hereinafter Taking
Reichs Seriously].
138. See discussion infra part II.B.3.
139. See discussion infra part II.B.3.
140. See infra note 141.
141. State practice may eventually become customary law, but only if states
conform to a practice on the basis of legal obligation.
Custom in its legal sense means something more than mere habit or
usage; it is usage felt by those who follow it to be an obligatory one.
There must be present a feeling that, if the usage is departed from,
some form of sanction will probably, or at any rate ought to, fall on the
transgressor.
BRIERLY, supra note 133, at 59. The practice of states with respect to state
succession has probably not yet reached such a stage in its development.
BROWNLIE, supra note 124, at 652.
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3. The Nature of State Practice
With respect to the law of state succession, state practice
appears generally to reflect policy considerations, especially
since the area is at least legally unsettled. 14 2 As a result, the
facts of the particular situation may be outcome-determina-
tive. 143 "The international community has an interest in
preventing states from disrupting treaty obligations with
every change of circumstance or every change of sovereignty.
However, the international community also has an interest in
allowing states to define their own legal identities."144 In the
absence of any clearly defined law of state succession, this
tension further suggests that policy will guide the practice of
states. Each time state succession issues are implicated, the
facts of the situation will determine the outcome until the law
is more clearly defined.1 4 5
4. Bosnia's Approach to International Obligations
In Yugoslavia, the problems are even more confounding
because one state is being replaced by a multitude of new
states. 4 6 The dissolution of Yugoslavia into its component
republics and the further potential breakup of some of the re-
publics themselves (e.g., Bosnia-Hercegovina)147 present dif-
ficult problems for international law. Bosnia is the most per-
tinent republic to deal with because its borders, and in fact its
existence, remain uncertain.148 The Minister of Foreign Af-
142. See generally SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN, supra note 134, at 68-71.
States usually resolve problems of state succession by way of an agreement and
not by reliance on international law:
It would be unsafe to attempt to abstract from rather scanty evidence a
general rule of subrogation or State succession.... [W]hat cannot be
attained on the level of customary international law can always be
achieved by way of consent. This is the safe road which, more often
than not, the practice of States has chosen.
Id. at 71.
143. Because there is no law to apply, states will act based upon their policy
interests on issues of state succession. Id. These policy interests, in turn, may
be determined by the facts of each situation. Hence, the facts of each case-
including the relative power of the states involved, the nature and importance
of the controversy, and the existence of an ongoing relationship-determine the
outcome. See, e.g., discussion infra part II.B.4.
144. Taking Reichs Seriously, supra note 137, at 599.
145. See supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 78-83; see also generally Alan Rid-
ing, Europe Nods to Bosnia, Not Macedonia, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 1992, at A3.
147. See discussion supra part II.A.3.
148. See Peace in the Hands of Unpeaceful Serbs, supra note 21, at 41.
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fairs of Bosnia wrote to the President of the European Com-
munity Council to request recognition 149 on December 20,
1991.150 Based on an opinion issued by the Arbitration Com-
mission, the request was denied.' 5 ' The Commission noted
that the President and the Government of Bosnia had agreed
to abide by the Commission's guidelines and the draft Con-
vention by the Hague Conference of November 4, 1991, guar-
anteeing human rights. 152 Furthermore, on January 8, 1992,
the Bosnian Government agreed to be bound by the UN Char-
ter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, and all other international in-
struments guaranteeing human rights and freedoms, and to
conform to the agreements binding upon the old state of Yu-
goslavia on disarmament and arms control.153
The scope of these obligations is great and demonstrates
both the broad powers of the Arbitration Commission and the
increasingly vigorous force of international legal obliga-
tions.15 4 The vast number of responsibilities generated by
the adoption of these agreements is compounded by the fact
that, among them, only the UN charter and the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights are actually treaties. 55 The re-
mainder are merely agreements that are not usually consid-
149. Bosnia, as well as the other former Yugoslav republics that have sought
recognition, appears to have revived the constitutive theory of recognition.
. The legal significance of recognition is controversial. According to
one view it has a "constitutive" effect; through recognition only and
exclusively a state becomes an international person and a subject of
international law ....
The better view is that the granting of recognition to a new state is
not a "constitutive" but a 'declaratory" act; it does not bring into legal
existence a state which did not exist before. A state may exist without
being recognized, and if it does in fact, then, whether or not it has been
formally recognized by other states, it has a right to be treated by them
as a state.
BRIERLY, supra note 133, at 138-39 (citation omitted).
150. Arbitration Commission Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 4, at 1
(Jan. 11, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Opinion No. 4].
151. Id.
152. Id. 1.
153. Id.
154. For a discussion of the increasing power of international legal obliga-
tions, see supra note 67 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the powers
of the Arbitration Commission, see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
155. U.N. CHARTER; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights].
ered mandatory rules of international law binding on all civi-
lized nations.156 Furthermore, the newly proposed Bosnian
Constitution provides human rights for all the inhabitants of
Bosnia." 7 The Commission noted that the Amendment to
the Constitution of July 31, 1990, Amendment LX, does not
alter Bosnian law, much to the disappointment of the Bos-
nian Government, which had relied upon this Amendment
heavily in its initial bid for recognition as an independent
state.15 8 Amendment LX 5 9 was not a sufficient alteration of
Bosnian law for Bosnia to receive recognition, yet it is diffi-
cult to conceive of more egalitarian language than that of the
amendment. The Commission concluded that "the will of the
peoples of Bosnia-Hercegovina to constitute the SRBH [So-
cialist Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina] as a sovereign and in-
dependent State cannot be held to have been fully estab-
lished."160 The Bosnian government established the will of
the people of Bosnia by holding a referendum on March 1,
1992: ninety-nine percent of the votes favored
independence.'
6
'
On December 21, 1991, the Serbs formed a legislative
body, the "Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia-
Hercegovina," in response to Bosnia's bid to depart fully from
the Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia. 162 That body declared an
156. See Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292; Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990,
30 I.L.M. 190; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); see also generally Joseph
Gold, Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements, 77
Am. J. INT'L L. 443 (1983) (discussing the status of such non-binding "soft law").
157. Opinion No. 4, supra note 150, 1. The Arbitration Commission noted:
The current Constitution of the SRBH [Socialist Republic of Bosnia-
Hercegovina] guarantees respect for human rights, and the authorities
of Bosnia-Hercegovina have sent the Commission a list of the laws in
force giving effect to those principles; they also gave the Commission
assurances that the new Constitution now being framed would provide
full guarantees for individual human rights and freedoms.
Id.
158. Id. t 3.
159. According to the Commission, Amendment LX "states that the Republic
of Bosnia-Hercegovina is a 'sovereign democratic State of equal citizens, com-
prising the peoples of Bosnia-Hercegovina-Muslims, Serbs and Croats-and
members of other peoples and nationalities living on its territory.'" Id.
160. Id. $ 4.
161. See supra note 25.
162. Opinion No. 4, supra note 150, 3.
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independent Serbian state in Bosnia on January 9, 1992.163
Due to the uncertainty of the situation at the time, the Com-
mission did not grant recognition to the Serbs in Bosnia,
either. 164
The Arbitration Commission ruled on July 4, 1992, that
since Yugoslavia had ceased to exist and Serbia's bid to suc-
ceed it was not acceptable, the property, assets, and debts of
the former state were to be divided equitably among the re-
publics. 165 Serbia was declared a new state, but the Commis-
sion left it to other nations to officially recognize it as such,
while adding that the act of recognition was declarative and
not constitutive in effect.166 The Commission also concluded
that Serbia could not automatically succeed to the now-ex-
tinct Yugoslavia, because the rights of that state belong to all
the former republics and not to Serbia alone. 167
Many other federations have undergone a far smoother
transition.16 8 The general rule upon the dissolution of a fed-
eration or union is that federal laws or treaties that are appli-
cable to a successor state are binding upon that successor
state. 69  For example, upon the dissolution of Rwanda-
Urundi in 1962, the Belgians who managed the transition en-
163. Id.
164. See id. $ 4. Since the Commission denied independence to the Republic
of Bosnia as a whole, it is hardly surprising that the Bosnian Serbs were not
granted independence by the Commission. Id. The Commission was probably
awaiting the outcome of a referendum encompassing all of Yugoslavia. Weller,
supra note 68, at 593.
165. Arbitration Commission Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 9, T 4
(July 4, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Opinion No. 9]. This decision is
in conformance with Article 41 of the Convention on Succession of States in
Respect of State Property, supra note 128.
166. Arbitration Commission Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 10, T 4
(July 4, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Opinion No. 10]. For the dis-
tinction between declarative and constitutive recognition, see supra note 149.
167. Opinion No. 10, supra note 166, 9 4.
168. See generally, 1 O'CONNELL, supra note 61, at 114-18 (discussing the
effects of state succession on municipal law); 2 id. at 164-82 (discussing the
effects of state succession on international law); see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 169-175.
169. 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 61, at 164-65. "[Tlreaties which are compati-
ble with the transformation of the respective legal orders survive the change,
and that each of the successor States remains a party thereto." 2 id. at 165.
If, for example, a federal treaty of the Kingdom of Sweden and Norway
dealt only with reciprocal fishing rights between Danish and Norwegian terri-
tory, the treaty would not apply to Sweden upon dissolution of the Kingdom of
Sweden and Norway. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
sured the continuity of law and contracts. 170 The Federation
of the West Indies was also dissolved in the same year with
similar grace. 171 The division of the Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland (1953-63), however, was fraught with legal
difficulties because Southern Rhodesia quickly moved to de-
clare many federal laws void, which laws were theoretically
the law of the new states. 172 Upon the partition of India in
1947, Pakistan and India were to continue to apply the law of
India until altered by legislation. 173 Pakistan attempted to
extract itself from some of the obligations that the law im-
posed, but broader problems were avoided. 174 Singapore was
separated from Malaysia in 1965, after which the old law con-
tinued to apply to both states. 7 '
Cases involving the dissolution of a union of autonomous
divisions are exemplified by the breakup of the Kingdom of
Sweden and Norway in 1905176 and that of Columbia in 1829-
31.177 Such dissolutions pose similar questions as those of re-
publics of previously independent states, such as the United
Arab Republic 178 and the Federation of Mali. 179 The German
Confederation (1815-66), terminated by the Final Act of Vi-
enna, also raised questions of the applicability of federal law
to newly independent states.1
8 0
When a state divides not merely on the lines of its repub-
lics, but also undergoes further intra-republic fragmentation,
170. 1 O'CONNELL, supra note 61, at 114.
171. 1 id.
172. 1 id. at 50-51, 114-15. Southern Rhodesia unilaterally voided 148 fed-
eral acts (inclusive of laws relating to federal loans) and modified 79 others. 1
id. at 115.
173. 1 id. at 116.
174. 1 id. at 116-17. The principal conflict occurred when the Supreme
Court of Pakistan held that the Convention of Arbitral Awards was inapplicable
to Pakistan. 1 id. at 57 & n.7, 116 (citing Barlas Bros. v. Yangtze Ltd., 11 Pak.
Legal Decisions 573 (1961)).
175. 1 O'CONNELL, supra note 61, at 118.
176. Upon the dissolution, the British took the novel approach of suggesting
that since the Kingdom had terminated, the slate was clean for the two coun-
tries to create treaty obligations and duties. Sweden and Norway, however,
decided to apply territory-specific treaties only to the applicable state, and all
other treaties were to be applied to both. 2 id. at 164, 168-69.
177. 2 id. at 164.
178. Even after the dissolution of the Union, Syria affirmed that it was still
bound by treaties that it signed while a member of the Union. 2 id. at 164, 169-
70.
179. 2 id. at 164.
180. 2 id. at 167.
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the legal repercussions are more perplexing. When the Dual
Monarchy of Austria-Hungary was severed in 1919, the coun-
try was divided into not just the two nations, but also into
further subdivisions, creating states such as Czechoslova-
kia.181 The new states carved out of parts of the halves of the
Dual Monarchy were not considered bound by the Empire's
Treaties, and started with a clean slate.182 Yet the efforts by
the Czech courts to extricate themselves from treaty obliga-
tions resulted in reprisals by foreign courts and govern-
ments,18 3 suggesting that international pressures may de-
prive the "clean slate" rule of any operational significance.
Czechoslovakia would have fared much better in the world
community after its formation had it acceded to the Dual
Monarchy's treaties, especially considering that many of
them would have conferred benefits upon the new state.1
8 4
The formation of Poland posed a far more vexing prob-
lem, as it inherited the legal systems of Prussia, Austria, and
Russia.' 85 Poland refused to adopt several treaties, which
angered its far more powerful European neighbors. 18 6 Since
three legal systems potentially imposing contradictory obliga-
tions were involved, however, it seems unlikely that anything
other than circumstance was to guide the Poles in defining
their international responsibilities. 87 In the present case,
Yugoslavia has been divided into its constituent republics,
but wars of ethnic cleansing have called into question the in-
181. 2 id. at 179-80.
182. 2 id. at 179.
183. 2 id. at 180.
184. 2 id. O'Connell describes Czechoslovakia's self-induced predicament:
[Tihe negative attitude taken by other States towards Czechoslovakia's
succession to the treaties of Austria-Hungary, was prompted by Czech-
oslovakia's own negative attitude. Many of the treaties in question
were reciprocal in character, and when the Czech courts refused to ap-
ply them, foreign courts retaliated in kind. It is clear from the various
judgments that, had the Czech courts taken a positive attitude, the
foreign courts could have reciprocated. It was pointed out at the time
that the Czech policy was not entirely to Czechoslovakia's own advan-
tage, and that therefore it was not as politically defensible as might at
first appear.
2 id. For example, when the Czech Supreme Court ruled that the 1905 Hague
Convention on Civil Procedure was not applicable to Czechoslovakia, even
though it had been applicable to Austria-Hungary, both Swiss and Dutch courts
later denied recovery by Czech citizens under the treaty. 2 id.
185. 2 id.
186. 2 id. at 180-81.
187. 2 id. at 181-82.
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tegrity of the boundaries between these republics.188 As a
consequence, the simpler state succession issues posed in the
cases of the Kingdom of Sweden and Norway,18 9 Mali, 190 and
the United Arab Republic' 9 ' may not be so easily applied.' 92
C. Self-Determination
Perhaps the single greatest driving force behind the con-
flict in the former Yugoslavia is self-determination.193 As lo-
cal governments became active after the withdrawal of the
Soviet Union from Eastern Europe, entrenched ethnic ten-
sions have been exposed.' 94 The trigger behind the issues of
state succession and civil war may lie at the door of rabid eth-
nic activity. And since it appears that ethnic radicalism has
propelled these issues to the forefront of present East Euro-
pean politics, 195 the question arises as to what limitations in-
ternational law could and should place on these drives. The
international law of self-determination is inextricably linked
to the present problem.'
96
1. The 1960 Declaration
The United Nations established self-determination as
part of international law by including it among the goals set
forth in the Charter.19 Article 1 lists among the purposes of
the UN, "[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based
on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determi-
188. In other words, although Yugoslavia certainly no longer exists, the
boundaries between the states that will replace Yugoslavia remain unresolved.
See discussion supra part II.A.3.
189. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
190. See supra text accompanying note 179.
191. See supra text accompanying note 178.
192. Furthermore, although presumably federal laws and treaties that apply
to each of the new republics would be binding on them, it may not be possible to
apply this principle to Bosnia simply because its continued existence has yet to
be assured. See supra notes 148, 169 and accompanying text.
193. Weller, supra note 68, at 607.
194. GLENNY, supra note 4, at 32-33.
195. See generally supra note 3.
196. The international law of self-determination, which outlines the rights of
ethnic groups, is obviously an essential tool in examining the ethnically driven
conflict in Bosnia. See discussion infra parts II.C.1-5.
197. Although at first seen to be nothing more than a faint objective, the
principle has been vigorously pursued by the UN through the course of
decolonization, and has become customary international law. BROWNLIE, supra
note 124, at 594.
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nation of peoples .... 19 In further reference to these goals,
Article 55 indicates that "stability and well-being" are also
required. 199 But since governments do not wish to diminish
the size of their states, the principle of territorial sovereignty
places a limit on the right of self-determination.20 0 States de-
fine themselves by their frontiers, 20 1 and any loss is a defeat:
"At the basis of international law lies the notion that a state
occupies a definite part of the surface of the earth, within
which it normally exercises, subject to the limitations im-
posed by international law, jurisdiction over persons and
198. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 2 (emphasis added). The use of the term "princi-
ple" rather than "right" in the Charter suggests that the Charter does not itself
create a right of self-determination. D.P. O'CONNELL, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW
337 (1965) ("A fundamental difficulty with the argument that the Charter has
created a right of self-determination in subject peoples is that it speaks only of a
'principle' and not of a right."); SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN, supra note 134, at
59 ("The principle of national self-determination is a formative principle of
great potency, but not part and parcel of international customary law."). But
see MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 100, at 193 (equally authentic French
text of UN Charter uses "droit," meaning "right," when referring to self-deter-
mination). Harris argues that, although the UN Charter itself may not have
made self-determination a right, it has become one:
The principle of self-determination is a controversial one. It has a
long history in international relations as a reason for cession of terri-
tory from one state to another and for the use of plebiscites to establish
the wishes of the inhabitants in this connection. Under the United Na-
tions Charter, it became the General Assembly's decolonisation policy
of the 1960s and 1970s .... The evidence ... suggests that the point
has been reached where the principle has generated a rule of interna-
tional law by which the political future of a colonial or similar non-
independent territory should be determined in accordance with the
wishes of its inhabitants.
HARRIS, supra note 127, at 116 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). This com-
ment proceeds from the assumption that Harris is correct in viewing self-deter-
mination as having developed into a right. The remaining question, of course,
is the exact nature of the right. See discussion infra part II.C.5.
199. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
200. Generally the satisfaction of one principle is at the expense of another;
if a state's territory is to remain fixed, it follows that the desire of peoples for
independence within its borders will not be fulfilled.
201. Brownlie notes that although the Montevideo Convention on Rights and
Duties of States outlines the four basic qualifications for statehood, these quali-
fications need not be absolute, noting that Albania was recognized as a state
even though its frontiers had yet to be firmly established. BROWNLIE, supra
note 124, at 74.
Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention states: "The State as a person of
international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent
population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into
relations with other States." Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of
States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. The choice of language
("should" instead of "must") infuses flexibility into the doctrine.
things to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of other states."20 2
Thus, a conflict exists between the rights of a people to create
their own sovereign state and territorial integrity. The con-
flict has almost always been resolved in favor of territorial
integrity. 20
3
Because the Charter alone does not bring depth to this
tension, the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Grant-
ing of Independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples of
1960 details the general reference to self-determination in
the Charter:
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination;
by virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cul-
tural development;
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disrup-
tion of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a
country is incompatible with the Purposes and Principles
of the Charter of the United Nations.20 4
These two sections vividly reflect the conflict between the
right of self-determination and the right of territorial integ-
rity. Although the breakup of Yugoslavia may by some inter-
pretations violate paragraph 6, it is perfectly in keeping with
the letter and spirit of paragraph 2.20 Furthermore, the in-
202. BRIERLY, supra note 133, at 162.
203. See generally Jost Delbruck, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Interven-
tion Under the Authority of the United Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887, 900 (1992);
Lloyd N. Cutler, The Internationalization of Human Rights, 1990 U. ILL. L.
REV. 575, 589. Harris notes:
On the question of political self-determination for minorities such
as the Scots, the French Canadians, the Kurds (in Iran, Iraq, Turkey),
the Nagas (in India), and the Somalis (in Kenya) in existing states ....
there is little evidence in United Nations or other state practice to sug-
gest that the right to self-determination applies outside of the colonial
or similar context as a matter of customary international law.
HARRIS, supra note 127, at 124-25. Thus, the right of self- determination may
apply only to "peoples," and not to minorities. Id.
204. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1960).
205. Clearly, the dissolution of Yugoslavia is a total disruption of national
unity, but certainly the goal of self-determination was furthered by the disrup-
tion. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. Thus, these two principles of
the Declaration seem fundamentally incompatible.
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tended application of this Declaration was decolonization, 20 6
which is not precisely identical to the problems currently
posed in Yugoslavia.20 7 Instead of one state being granted in-
dependence by another, a federation of states has been dis-
solved. 20  Thus the language of the Declaration alone does
not truly resolve the problem at hand.
The Arbitration Commission has declared that although
the scope of the right of self-determination is unclear, it does
not permit the redrawing of boundaries. 20 9 There is signifi-
cant historical precedent 210 for its assertion that territorial
integrity is paramount: "[I]t is well established that,
whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination
must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of
independence . . . except where the States concerned agree
otherwise."211 Yet the Commission went on to state that the
rights of minorities must be protected in accordance with Ar-
ticle 1 of the two 1966 International Covenants on Human
Rights.212 The text of Article 1 is identical for both Cove-
nants: "All people have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment."21 3 The Commission called upon the former Yugoslav
republics to respect the rights of minorities within their bor-
ders and to allow them to choose their nationality "where ap-
propriate."21 4 It is difficult to assess the meaning of this
choice if the borders are to remain fixed-perhaps it simply
guarantees a right to emigrate to one's republic of choice. In
206. See Louis B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTEC-
TION OF HuMAN RIGHTS 415 (1973) (quoting G.A. Res. 1568, U.N. GAOR, 15th
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960)).
207. See supra note 203 and accompanying text; see discussion supra part
II.A.
208. Weller, supra note 68, at 569.
209. Arbitration Commission Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 2, 1
(Jan. 11, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Opinion No. 2].
210. Examples include Texan independence in 1840; the border between
Hannover and the Netherlands, when Prussia annexed Hannover in 1866; and
the acquisition by Germany of Alsace-Lorraine in 1891. 2 O'CONNELL, supra
note 61, at 273.
211. Opinion No. 2, supra note 209, 1.
212. Id. 3.
213. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 155;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3.
214. Opinion No. 2, supra note 209, 4.
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any case, the Commission has provided firm language that
although the rights of minorities must be respected in accord-
ance with international law, the territorial integrity of the
new states must be secure: "The boundaries between ... Bos-
nia-Hercegovina and Serbia... may not be altered except by
agreement freely arrived at."215 The Commission buttressed
its position by mentioning that Article 5 of the Yugoslav Con-
stitution declared that the borders of the republics could not
be altered without their consent.216 Bosnia has assured the
Commission that it has no territorial ambitions and that it
desires that the existing borders remain unchanged.217
2. South Africa's Bantustans: Independence or
Enclosure?
After the First World War, the mandate system was es-
tablished by the League of Nations, through which powerful
states would seek to grant independence to territories en-
trusted to them. 218 The 1960 Declaration articulates the fol-
lowing rule for mandates:
5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-
Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which
have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers
to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions
or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed
will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or
colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete indepen-
dence and freedom.219
South Africa has been a consistent violator of this provi-
sion, 2 20 and the UN's treatment of that noncompliance grants
depth and reality to the Declaration.221 South Africa had ac-
quired South West Africa (now Namibia) from Germany in
1915, and had attempted to divide the country on the basis of
race with respect to territory, but with all real power vested
215. Arbitration Commission Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No.3, ' 2
(Jan. 11, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Opinion No. 3].
216. Id.
217. Opinion No. 4, supra note 150, 1 1.
218. SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN, supra note 134, at 49.
219. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and
Peoples, supra note 204, at 67.
220. Specifically, the policy of apartheid employed by South Africa in the
mandate was the chief source of the UN's agitation. SCHWARZENBERGER &
BROWN, supra note 134, at 50.
221. See infra text accompanying notes 222-233.
1069BOSNIA1994]
1070 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
in the whites.222 Seeking to draw borders based on race,
South African whites reserved the best territory for them-
selves.223 This pretense of granting "freedom" to the indige-
nous peoples was wholly unsatisfactory to the UN.224 Negoti-
ations continued until 1988, when South Africa finally agreed
to grant South West Africa independence. 225 UN-supervised
elections were held in 1989, and Namibia is well on its way to
becoming a free, democratic state.226
The inhabitants of South Africa itself, however, have not
been quite so fortunate. The internationally condemned crea-
tion of bantustans227 or homelands has resulted in the crea-
tion of "autonomous" states inside South Africa.228  The
Transkei, the first to be granted "independence" in 1976, re-
mains subject to South Africa's control over defense, external
affairs, internal security, postal services, immigration, rail-
ways, currency, banking, customs, and excise. 229 The UN
quickly moved to condemn the creation of the Transkei as a
perpetuation of apartheid.23 ° South Africa's attempt to make
222. Christopher S. Wren, Namibia Achieves Independence After 75 Years of
Pretoria's Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1990, at Al.
223. D'Amato points out that:
[Tihe inequities are striking. It may be seen that more than half of the
black population is assigned a per capita land area of 0.23 square kilo-
meters, with the average being 0.74. In contrast, the whites have a per
capita land allocation varying from 21 to 29 times the median black
allocation and 7 to 9 times the mean.
ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAw: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 167 (1987).
224. In a General Assembly resolution, the UN decided to terminate South
Africa's mandate over the territory in 1966. Question of South West Africa, G.A.
Res. 2145, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
225. Wren, supra note 222, at Al.
226. Id.
227. The Bantu are the native tribes of the region; hence, the South African
government has named their homelands "bantustans." OZDEMIR A. OZGUR,
APARTHEID: THE UNITED NATIONS & PEACEFUL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA 34
(1982).
228. Id. at 34-36.
229. Id. at 34.
230. See Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa, G.A. Res.
31/6A, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/31/22 (1976)
[hereinafter G.A. Res. 31/6A]. In addition, the General Assembly called for
South Africa to respect its own territorial integrity:
[The General Assembly s]trongly condemns the establishment of ban-
tustans as designed to consolidate the inhuman policies of apartheid,
to destroy the territorial integrity of the country [of South Africa], to
perpetuate white minority domination and to dispossess the African
people of South Africa of their inalienable rights ....
the appearance of responding to the 1960 Declaration and Ar-
ticles 1 and 55 of the Charter has not been successful in con-
vincing the world community that anything other than imagi-
nary lines have been drawn within South Africa, and that the
self-determination problem has been resolved.23 ' Only South
Africa has recognized the Transkei as an independent
state.232 The UN has taken the position that the creation of
bantustans solidifies white minority rule over the vast major-
ity of South Africa's territory.233 By creating such reserva-
tions, South Africa can keep the indigenous population in
closely circumscribed boundaries.
The practice of South Africa in creating the bantustans is
instructive in two ways. First, the principle of territorial in-
tegrity has not been questioned.234 Second, equality of treat-
ment and respect for human rights have taken precedence
over the right to independence. 235 These elements aid the
Bosnian government in arguing that its borders should re-
main fixed and that the equal rights protections guaranteed
in the Bosnian Constitution 236 satisfy international legal re-
quirements for states with ethnic minorities such as the
Serbs.237
3. Palestine and Claims of Self-Determination
Another dispute instructive in the resolution of the con-
flict in Yugoslavia is the status of the Palestinian Arabs in
231. See, e.g., Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa, G.A.
Res. 2671F, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 31, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 2671F].
232. OZGUR, supra note 227, at 34.
233. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2671F, supra note 231, at 31.
234. The United Nations did not suggest that the bantustans should receive
actual independence, but that their inhabitants should be granted equal rights
within the present borders of South Africa. See supra note 230 and accompany-
ing text.
235. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
236. Opinion No. 4, supra note 150, 1.
237. The United Nations' primary objection to South Africa's creation of the
bantustans in Resolution 31/6A was South Africa's attempt to avoid granting
equal rights to all of its citizens. See G.A. Res. 31/6A, supra note 230. Thus, if
the Bosnian government grants equal rights to all of its citizens, the UN could
raise no objection to Bosnia's treatment of its minorities under the principles of
resolution 31/6A. Id.
The Arbitration Commission, however, did not find the granting of equal
rights conclusive with respect to Bosnia's bid for independence: they denied rec-
ognition of Bosnia's independence until a referendum was held. See supra text
accompanying notes 157-161.
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Israel. Resolution 242 of the UN Security Council 238 calls for
the Arab states to recognize Israel and for Israel to withdraw
from the territories that it has occupied since the 1967
war.239 Israel has shown no intention of withdrawing from
the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, Jerusalem, and the West
Bank.240 The claim of the Palestinians that the principle of
self-determination in the UN Charter and the Declaration of
1960 mandates the return of these territories has been hotly
contested. 241 Although it has been suggested that there is no
right of self-determination in international law,24 2
decolonization, for example, cannot be explained fully with-
out it. 243 The Declaration and the Charter clearly indicate
that self-determination is at least a rule of international law
articulated by the General Assembly of the UN.244 It may not
grant independent states to every group, but that should not
be taken to mean that the rule does not exist.
Competing with the right of self-determination, the right
of a state to be secure in its territory and internal politics
must not be discounted.245 Furthermore, when a minority
group seeks independence or secession, the self-determina-
tion rights of the majority and other minority groups must
also be considered.246 When two groups both seeking to in-
voke rights of self-determination come into conflict, a gain for
one is a loss for the other. While both the Palestinian Arabs
and the Israelis have claims to the land, there is little basis
238. U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1382d mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/8247 (1967).
239. Michael Akehurst, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and International Law, 5
N.Z.U. L. REv. 231, 242-43 (1973).
240. Robert Pear, Mideast Talks Get Promising Reviews, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
30, 1992, at A6.
241. For an advocation of the Israeli viewpoint on these issues, see Malvina
Halberstam, Self-Determination in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 465 (1989).
242. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
243. See Nathaniel Berman, "But the Alternative Is Despair": European Na-
tionalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 HARv. L. REV.
1792, 1901 (1993).
244. See discussion supra part II.C.1.
245. See supra text accompanying note 200.
246. Since territorial integrity demands that states be kept whole, the will of
the people of the entire country must be considered rather than the will of a
minority group. Thus, although self-determination grants independence in the
colonial context (because border changes are not implicated), it may not allow
minority groups to secede from an existing state. See supra note 203 and ac-
companying text.
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for arguing that the Palestinians have no claim at all.247 In
Bosnia, the Croats, Muslims, and Serbs must understand
that although they have rights to self-determination,248 this
goal must be balanced with the right of Bosnia to remain in-
tact. The free election principle in Western Sahara2 49 may
not be applied. In that case, the people of Western Sahara
were to vote as a whole;250 in Bosnia, the issue would be pre-
determined depending on whether Bosnia voted as a whole or
the vote was divided in some manner. In other words, the
manner of the division would dictate the outcome. If Bosnia
voted as a whole, the Muslims would clearly win.25 1 But
since the Serbs now control the majority of Bosnia, it appears
that this fact will be taken into account.252 Even though the
right of Bosnia to exist as a whole may be stronger than the
rights of the components of Bosnia to go their separate
253ways, a compromise will probably be the ultimate outcome.
The solution proposed by the Vance-Owen Plan did not pur-
port to divide Bosnia,25 4 but that may still be the result. 255
4. Title by Conquest
The law of conquest is also instructive in both Israel and
Bosnia. The Israelis have conquered land and have sought to
retain it. 256 The Bosnian Serbs are attempting to accomplish
a similar result,257 and both the Israelis and the Bosnian
Serbs explicitly state that they have the authoritative claim
to the land that they have "reconquered." 25' This sort of
claim may fall prey to the simple fact that acquisition of terri-
247. Halberstam, supra note 241, at 471-74.
248. Everyone has the right of self-determination, but minorities are not
generally entitled to exercise that right because of the rule of territorial integ-
rity. See supra text accompanying notes 200-203.
249. 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
250. Id. 57.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
252. All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, June 22,
1993).
253. See discussion supra part II.C.1.
254. Balman, supra note 102.
255. Hard Men Take the Long View, supra note 110, at 48.
256. Pear, supra note 240, at A6. Israel captured the Gaza Strip, the Golan
Heights, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank in the Six Days' War of 1967.
Akehurst, supra note 239, at 241.
257. Hard Men Take the Long View, supra note 110, at 48.
258. Pear, supra note 240, at A6; Reaction to Geneva Conference, supra note
106.
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tory by conquest is invalid per se in international law,2 5 9 un-
less of course the conqueror has the ability to retain the land
(usually accompanied by some justification, valid or not).
260
The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law
provides that:
The territory of a State shall not be the object of military
occupation resulting from the use of force in contravention
of the provisions of the Charter. The territory of a State
shall not be the object of acquisition by another State re-
sulting from the threat or use of force. No territorial ac-
quisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be
recognised as legal.261
In application to the use of force by the Bosnian Serbs, the
crucial passage of the declaration is the final sentence of the
quotation.262 The Bosnian Serbs, although not a state, still
fall within that definition, because the sentence applies to
any acquisition resulting from the use of force.263 As the
Serbs have conquered nearly all of Bosnia by force,26 4 their
acquisitions would appear to be invalid under the 1970
Declaration.
Bosnia's President Izetbegovic has complained that the
proposed division of Bosnia grants the Serbs land taken by
force.265 Such a grant is not, however, without precedent;
Portugal recognized the impossibility of recovering the terri-
tory that it lost to India in the dispute over Goa in 1961.266
259. Originating from the prohibition of force by UN members in Article 2(4)
of the Charter, the maxim has developed into customary international law
binding on all states. See HARRIS, supra note 127, at 201. Article 2(4) states
that "[aill Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Na-
tions." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 4.
260. BRIERLY, supra note 133, at 172-73.
261. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Re-
lations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121,
U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
262. The Bosnian Serbs have clearly violated this passage by their use of
force in acquiring territory in Bosnia. See discussion supra part II.A.3.
263. The second sentence of the Declaration expressly prohibits states from
acquiring territory by force; the third sentence prohibits anyone from acquiring
territory by force. See supra text accompanying note 261.
264. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
265. All Things Considered, supra note 252.
266. See U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., 987th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. S/PV.987
(1961). India assembled an invasion force of 30,000 troops, supported by tanks,
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Although the UN condemned the use of force by India in ac-
quiring Goa, no action was taken to reinstall Portuguese au-
thority, and Portugal recognized India's ownership of the ter-
ritory in 1974.267 Although occurring before the 1970
Declaration, India's action is nonetheless a clear violation of
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which at least prohibits the
use of force by Members of the UN.268 Thus, the ability of
states to acquire title to territory by conquest may depend on
their ability to do so, or on the ability and willingness of
someone else to prevent them.
Britain recovered the Falkland Islands from Argentina,
partially on the basis of a legal claim to the territory and par-
tially on the principle of self-determination.269 In that case,
Britain had the ability to prevent the conquest of its territory,
just as in the recent Gulf War of 1991, when other states had
the ability to prevent Iraq from acquiring Kuwait through the
use of force.2 7 0 In that conflict, apparently, no members of
the Security Council accepted Iraq's claim that Kuwait was a
historical province of Iraq. 271 Title by conquest, however,
may still be successful. As Brierly indicates, "so long as war
aircraft, and warships. R.A.H. ROBINSON, CONTEMPORARY PORTUGAL 104
(1979). The Portuguese forces in Goa, however, amounted to perhaps 3,000
poorly-equipped troops, with neither tanks nor aircraft. Id.; Quincy Wright,
The Goa Incident, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 617, 622 (1962). India quickly defeated the
Portuguese, who were powerless to stop the Indian forces. ROBINSON, supra, at
104. Portuguese reliance on international assistance was eliminated when the
Soviet Union vetoed a Security Council resolution demanding the withdrawal of
the Indian invasion force. Id.
267. Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 452, 453 (1991).
268. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
269. See Thomas M. Franck, Dulce et Decorum Est: The Strategic Role of
Legal Principles in the Falklands War, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 109, 116 (1983).
270. See generally Schachter, supra note 267, at 453. British military power,
exercised through the well-equipped Royal Navy, resoundingly defeated the Ar-
gentine forces. MAX HASTINGS & SIMON JENKINS, THE BATTLE FOR THE FALK-
LANDS 315-19 (1983). Thus, although the situation in the Falklands was rela-
tively similar to that in Goa, the key distinction is that the British had the
capacity to dislodge the Argentine forces, whereas the Portuguese simply did
not have the capacity to reclaim Goa. Id.; see also supra note 266 and accompa-
nying text.
Another distinction between the Falklands and Goa is that although Goa
was inhabited predominately by Indians rather than by Portuguese (out of a
population of 650,000, only 800 were Europeans), the Falklands clearly desired
to remain British. HARRIS, supra note 127, at 204 n.68; HASTINGS & JENKINS,
supra, at 12-13 (quoting that Falklands and Gibraltar are "British colonies and
proud of it").
271. See Schachter, supra note 267, at 453.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
continues to be used as an instrument of national policy, it
will continue to produce the same results as it has in the
past, and one of those will be the annexation of territory."272
Law alone cannot always guide events on the international
plane.
5. Self-Determination and Yugoslavia
The present state of self-determination law indicates
that a right to self-determination exists,273 but the scope of
that right has three principal hurdles that it must clear
before those who seek independence will receive it. 274 First,
the individuals at issue must constitute a "people."275 It may
not be possible to satisfy this definition outside of the colonial
context.276 Second, the rights of a people to independence
must be balanced with the rights of the state that they cur-
rently inhabit as well as the rights of other minority groups
in the area.277 Third, the state in which the people currently
reside is sovereign and is thus granted great autonomy in its
internal affairs.278 Moreover, most of the UN activity on self-
determination applies to colonies and mandates, 279 not to
peoples within existing, independent states. The resolution
of any self-determination controversy must deal with all of
these elements.
272. BRIERLY, supra note 133, at 172.
273. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
274. See infra text accompanying notes 275-279.
275. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 2; see also supra note 198. Harris argues
that minorities do not possess the right, limiting the application of self-determi-
nation to the colonial context. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. The
Bosnian Serbs may constitute a minority only because they do not have a sepa-
rate colonial state. See supra notes 203, 246 and accompanying text. Thus, the
right of self-determination may not be available to the Bosnian Serbs.
276. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 245-246
278. The principle of state sovereignty is always difficult to reconcile with
international law:
To the extent that sovereignty has come to imply that there is some-
thing inherent in the nature of states that makes it impossible for
them to be subjected to law, it is a false doctrine which the facts of
international relations do not support. But to the extent that it re-
minds us that the subjection of states to law is an aim as yet only very
imperfectly realized, and one which presents the most formidable diffi-
culties, it is a doctrine which we cannot afford to disregard.
BRIERLY, supra note 133, at 47-48.
279. See discussion supra parts II.C.1-2.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The Rights of the New State of Bosnia v. The Rights of
Bosnian Serbs to Secede
Upon the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the republics of Bos-
nia, Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia have become in-
dependent nations, and Vojvodina, Montenegro, and Kosovo
have remained part of Serbia. 280 Although Serbia has not yet
been recognized as an independent state, it functions as an
independent state, so that the absence of formal recognition
amounts to nothing more than sanctions.28 1 The recognition
of Bosnia on April 6, 1992 by the EC, in an effort to avoid the
carnage that has in fact occurred, 28 2 has allowed Bosnian
leaders to retain the high ground.28 3 Although they have
been overpowered by the military might of the Serbs in Bos-
281nia, they are a separate country, with all the rights that
flow from that status.
285
The Bosnian Serbs, although militarily dominant in Bos-
nia, only constitute a third of its population.2 86 Since Bosnia
has become a single entity,28 7 its fate should be decided by its
population as a whole. Although its fate will instead be dic-
tated to it by the International Conference on the Former Yu-
goslavia,28 8 legally it need not be so. Bosnia has every right
to deal with its population as it wishes within the rules of
international law.28 9 Yet the simple fact that the Muslim
plurality is at the whim of the ethnic-cleansing Serb minority
makes all the difference. 290 The Conference is correct in
striking the balance between Bosnia's rights as a state and
280. See supra text accompanying notes 78-83.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 165-166.
282. Riding, supra note 146, at A3.
283. Id.
284. Marcus Tanner, Owen Hits at Serbian Expansion, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Nov. 5, 1992, at 17.
285. The UN Charter states: "The Organization [the UN] is based on the
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." U.N. CHARTER art 2, 1.
For a discussion of state sovereignty, see BRIERLY, supra note 133, at 7-16, 45-
56; see also supra note 278 and accompanying text.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 20, 284.
287. See supra note 82 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompa-
nying note 87.
288. See supra note 68.
289. See discussion supra part II.C.1.
290. Burns, supra note 108, § 1, at 5.
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Serbia's ability to fight indefinitely.29 1 Unless the Bosnian
Serbs are appeased, Bosnia may not last very long. Although
its existence may be tenuous in any case, there is no need to
hasten the date of its demise.
Bosnia's government has two choices, and it appears that
it is pursuing the more pragmatic course. It could reject the
division of Bosnia in any way, refusing to acknowledge Ser-
bian conquest; or it could recognize the strength of the Ser-
bian position (i.e., actually holding the territory in question-
three-quarters of the country, and threatening the rest), and
accept a compromise agreement that would at least ensure
the continued existence of the Bosnian state.292 Bosnia's
President has wisely accepted the latter alternative.293
1. Obligations of Bosnia to the Serbian Minority
Every state has obligations to its population.294 Usually
inclusive of the right to vote and the protection of human
rights, the Serbs will have to stretch these traditional defini-
tions dramatically. Certainly, Bosnia must not seek to disen-
franchise or exterminate its Serbian population, but beyond
that, it will be difficult for the Bosnian Serbs to argue that
they should be permitted to secede from Bosnia. The greatest
asset of the Serbs is that Bosnia is in a state of flux at the
moment 295 (almost entirely due to Serb hostilities), and thus
its borders, and perhaps its very existence, are rather ill-de-
fined. Yet even though the Muslims, acting alone, are un-
likely to be able to defeat the Serbs on the battlefield, Bosnia
has no legal duty to cave in to the Serbian demands, despite
whatever the proposals of the Conference indicate to the con-
trary.296 But regardless of what the Muslims agree to, it
seems unlikely that Bosnia's continued existence is assured.
The legal rights of Bosnian Serbs against Bosnia do not
include the right to secede or to dictate terms.297 Although
291. Peace in the Hands of Unpeaceful Serbs, supra note 21, at 41.
292. Id.
293. See Bosnia's Dismal Endgame, supra note 26, at 45.
294. The Arbitration Commission has noted Bosnia's adoption of all relevant
human rights treaties. See discussion supra part II.B.4.
295. See discussion supra part II.A.3.
296. At least theoretically, the weaknesses of the Muslims in fighting the
Serbs do not undermine Bosnian sovereignty, yet that may very well be the
result. See supra text accompanying notes 278, 284-285.
297. See discussion supra part II.C.1.
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neither of these has occurred, they certainly lurk behind the
Conference's proposals. The rights of minority groups within
a state should never be taken so far as to dominate the major-
ity.29 Tyranny of the minority is even more repressive than
tyranny by the majority, because fewer people are in con-
trol.299 The 1966 UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
includes in Article 27: "In those States in which ethnic, reli-
gious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture,
to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own
language."30 0 During the drafting of Article 27, it was very
clear in the committee reports that the article was not in-
tended to undermine the sovereignty of the nations in which
these minorities resided, and that minority domination
should not be tolerated.30 1 Although the Bosnian Serbs must
not be discriminated against, they have no right of indepen-
dence under international law.30 2 Thus, the only right that
the Bosnian Serbs have to rely on is their might.
2. State Succession and the New State of Bosnia-Its
Rights
The creation and recognition of Bosnia as an independ-
ent state is best interpreted as an example of state succession
rather than a change in government.30 3 The borders of Bos-
nia have not, at least theoretically, been changed since it was
a republic of Yugoslavia,30 4 but it certainly is a new state. As
such, it can legally choose to adopt the treaties of the former
Yugoslavia that apply to its territory,30 5 but its choice is not
as important as it might appear for two reasons. First, the
problems faced by Bosnia have more to do with practical con-
siderations than with international law.30 6 Second, the ap-
298. See discussion supra part II.C.1.
299. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (arguing that a larger
union would ensure a greater number of interests, balancing one another out).
300. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 155, art. 27.
301. See SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 206, at 317-19.
302. Again, self-determination is probably inapplicable outside of the colo-
nial context. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 124.
304. Opinion No. 3, supra note 215, 2.
305. See discussion supra parts II.B.1-4.
306. Bosnia's approach to the international law of state succession has been
dictated by its desire to have the backing of the international community in
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proach that a new state will have to its rights and duties will
be driven by facts, not law, primarily because the law of state
succession remains unclear.3 °7 Because only an intervening
military force from abroad will ever be able to restrain the
Serbs, Bosnia must weigh the competing forces of its sover-
eignty against its desire to befriend other states. So long as
Bosnia's leaders manage to portray themselves as the victims
of Serb aggression, they will probably manage to keep world
opinion firmly on their side.30  Bosnia must restrain itself
from pushing its case too far, for it might risk losing
everything.
Thus circumscribed, Bosnia cannot risk offending. The
international law of state succession does allow it some lati-
tude, but the UN and the EC may be fundamentally unwill-
ing to fight a protracted war against the Serbs for Bosnia.30 9
They appear willing to secure a peace but unwilling to use
military force to assert absolute control over Bosnia for its
Muslim plurality. 10 In any case, Bosnia must be careful in
exercising its new-found rights in a world order that gives
less and less credence to the theory of unchartered national
sovereignty,311 especially when the step required to secure
that absolute sovereignty includes the loss of life by other
nations.
3. A New State?
Title by conquest is unlikely to grant the Serbs any fa-
vors. Although they do have the right to occupy their own
property, they do not have the right to take the property of
others in Bosnia, or anywhere else. Although the Serbs have
largely been successful in making their desired territorial ad-
vances, they risk complete isolation by the world commu-
contending with the Bosnian Serbs. See discussion supra parts II.B.1-4. Thus,
Bosnia has agreed to subject itself to a multitude of treaties. See supra text
accompanying notes 152-156.
307. See discussion supra part II.B.2.
308. Peace in the Hands of Unpeaceful Serbs, supra note 21, at 41.
309. See EC: Bosnian Serbs Face Total Isolation If They Do Not Accept the
Geneva Plan Unconditionally, Reuters, Jan. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Txtnws File (suggesting that sanctions may be the chief tool
employed by the UN and EC against the Serbs) [hereinafter Total Isolation].
310. Id.
311. The prerequisites placed by the Arbitration Commission on Bosnia's
recognition as an independent state point to further limitations on state sover-
eignty. See supra text accompanying notes 149-161.
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nity.3 12 The more they push, the more difficult it will be for
the world to permit them to retain their spoils. Yet the ques-
tion remains how to unseat the Serbs from what they have
fought so hard to gain. The Croats and Muslims in Serbia
have been fighting a losing battle, albeit on the right side.
The fact that the Serbs have gained so much territory was
reflected in the division of Bosnia into the ten semi-autono-
mous provinces in the Vance-Owen Plan, and in the more re-
cent effort to divide Bosnia into three fully autonomous prov-
inces.3 13 The actual boundaries of the provinces have always
been a matter of great dispute.3 14 The Serbs have demon-
strated their willingness to sign an agreement and then to
continue fighting in an attempt to connect their provinces
and then to join them with Serbia.315 Although there is no
legal basis for such activity,316 another state, or group of
states, would have to be firmly resolved to prevent such an
outcome. The Serbs have proven themselves the most effec-
tive combatants in the remnants of Yugoslavia, and despite
the embargo, the Bosnian Serbs have had access to Serbia's
extensive military hardware.3 1
Even if Bosnian Serb leaders are beginning to see that
the UN simply will not permit Bosnia to be stripped of ap-
proximately half of its territory, the Serbs with the guns may
not be quite so far-sighted.318 Having the upper hand,31 9 and
with a unified Greater Serbia in sight, 2 ° it is hard to imagine
that they will simply stop fighting. They have no reason to do
so. Whatever plans, proposals, and treaties are signed, it is
difficult to imagine anything other than continued ethnic
strife until everyone manages to take the territory they want,
to link it to their country of choice, and to stay within the
lines.
312. See Total Isolation, supra note 309.
313. See discussion supra part II.A.3.
314. See generally discussion supra part II.A.3.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 105-114.
316. See discussion supra part 1I.C.4.
317. Paul Lewis, U.N. Votes 13-0 for Embargo on Trade with Yugoslavia,
N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1992, § 1, at 1; Peace in the Hands of Unpeaceful Serbs,
supra note 21, at 41.
318. Tanner, supra note 284, at 17.
319. See supra text accompanying note 97.
320. See supra text accompanying note 108.
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B. Placing Limits on Claims of Self-Determination
Serbs in the former Yugoslavia have identified them-
selves as a group that wishes to join themselves together in
one single nation, based on race or ethnicity.3 21  This
trend,322 disturbing in its exclusionary and divisive under-
tones, is becoming ever more common. Countries once uni-
fied by a central authority are now disintegrating in a vis-
ceral ethnic urge to create a separate nation for themselves
where there is no need for compromise between different eth-
nic groups.323 Czechoslovakia, another historical construct,
has also fallen prey to this mania, despite the best efforts of
its President, Vaclav Havel. 24 Yugoslavia has taken a simi-
lar route, although a much more violent one.325 Serbs wish to
create a Serbian state based not on Serbia's borders, but on
where Serbs happen to live, and now based on what Serbs
have managed to conquer.3 26
The Serbs have expanded the basic doctrine of self-deter-
mination beyond its practical limits. When Hitler attempted
to unify Aryans and "ethnic Germans," regardless of whether
or not they actually lived in Germany, self-determination was
also being employed. 327 At one level, peoples subjected to
domination by colonial powers should be able to use self-de-
termination in order to choose to rule themselves, yet when
one people use the principle to take territory from neighbor-
ing independent states, self-determination merges into con-
quest. The Serbs in Bosnia do have rights, but those rights
must be balanced with the right of Bosnia to be secure in its
borders.
321. See generally discussion supra part II.A.
322. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
324. Havel Quits as Slovakia Fulfills 1,000-Year Dream, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), July 18, 1992, at 10. Both Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were cre-
ated out of the remnants of various empires after the First World War; both
contained a variety of ethnic groups. See supra text accompanying note 181.
325. See discussion supra part II.A.
326. See discussion supra part II.A.3.
327. See generally PAUL JOHNSON, MODERN TIMES 342-43 (1983) (describing
the basis of Hitler's racist designs on Europe).
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1. The Serbs as a People
In order for the Bosnian Serbs to be able to exercise the
right of self-determination, they must constitute a people.
28
As the 1960 Declaration indicates, a right of self-determina-
tion does exist, even though it has not always granted indige-
nous and dominated peoples their freedom. 29 In any case,
the right of self-determination is probably not available to the
Bosnian Serbs because they are probably best described as a
minority rather than a people.33 ° Peoples possess the right of
self-determination, whereas minorities do not.331 Generally,
the term "people" has been applied only in the colonial con-
text.332 Although members of a minority are entitled to cer-
tain basic rights from their country, they have no legal basis
for tearing it asunder. 3  The Serbs must not be permitted to
expand Serbia's borders, greatly diminishing the size of
Bosnia.
2. When Rights Collide
The second limitation on self-determination is the rights
of other groups. A minority must not be permitted to domi-
nate other groups, including the majority. 34 In the case of
Bosnia, the Serbs have become increasingly dominant in the
present conflict.3 35 The rights of the Croats and Muslims
who also inhabit the country must be weighed against the
rights of the Serbs to be autonomous or to join with Serbia.
Unfortunately, the Serbs in Bosnia are dispersed,33 6 and as a
matter of geography, they could not unite with Serbia with-
out the displacement of other groups, although this displace-
ment may have occurred already in any case.337 Again, the
right of the Serbs to unite with Serbia-to secede-is not a
right normally associated with self-determination. 33 8 Gener-
ally, self-determination grants independence only to op-
328. See supra text accompanying note 275.
329. See discussion supra part II.C.1.
330. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
333. See discussion supra part II.C.1.
334. See discussion supra part II.C.3.
335. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
336. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
337. See discussion supra part II.A.3.
338. See discussion supra part II.C.3.
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pressed colonial nations and not to minority groups. 3 3 9 The
focus of self-determination with respect to minority groups
has been equal rights, not independence. 4 °
The cost of permitting the Serbs to secede would be to
sanction the uprooting of many indigenous groups in order to
connect the Bosnian Serbs with Serbia.3 4' Furthermore, it
might only encourage the Serbs to acquire more territory so
that they might take it with them when seceding to Serbia.
Also, the rights of Bosnia to maintain its existing territory
are strong indeed. 42 It has long been considered obvious
that the granting of equal rights to minority groups should
never be escalated to the granting of independence for such
groups.343 Interestingly, Serbian leaders took this position
when Croatia and Slovenia seceded from Yugoslavia. 344 Yu-
goslavia (then dominated by Serbia) declared that it had a
right to compel these provinces to remain as part of Yugosla-
via, and were permitted to use force in doing So. 4 5 In the
case of Bosnia, the only real difference between its secession
from Yugoslavia and the Serbian parts of Bosnia from Bosnia
is that the borders had already been drawn in the former
case.3 46 This distinction is much more significant than it
might at first appear: as soon as borders become flexible, the
limits of that flexibility are usually tested. 47 Thus, it is vi-
tally important to attempt to retain existing boundaries. Un-
less the Serbs become truly intransigent, Bosnia's govern-
ment has nothing to gain by sanctioning their
independence. 48
339. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
340. See discussion supra parts I.C.1-2.
341. See supra text accompanying note 24.
342. See discussion supra part II.C.1.
343. See discussion supra parts II.C.1-2.
344. See Weller, supra note 68, at 582.
345. See id.
346. Opinion No. 3, supra note 215, 1 2.
347. See discussion supra part II.A.
348. Although Bosnia may lose much of its territory to the Bosnian Serbs,
Bosnia has nothing to gain by acquiescing to Bosnian Serb demands for inde-
pendence because such an action would deprive the Bosnian government of the
little bargaining strength that it has retained. See discussion supra part
II.A.3.
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3. Bosnian Sovereignty and the Limits of Self
Determination
Bosnia is a sovereign state and therefore possesses a
strong presumption of territorial integrity. 49 If a state is not
secure in its borders, it cannot be secure in very much at all.
Bosnia stands to lose half or more of its country by agreeing
to a settlement drafted by the International Conference on
the Former Yugoslavia. 350 By agreeing to such a plan, how-
ever, it may at least put a limit on the territory that will be
under Serb control. 5 ' On the other hand, even if the Serbs
do abide by the terms of the agreement, and end up with their
autonomous province within Bosnia, the sovereignty of Bos-
nia will already have taken a beating.3 52 When weighed
against the right of Bosnia to maintain its borders, Serbs
have little to the contrary that they may argue under interna-
tional law.353 The risk is that they will not argue, but they
will merely take the land in question, regardless of what any
agreement stipulates. Serb rights to self-determination can-
not trump the right of Bosnia to maintain its sovereignty, but
it is as yet unclear whether the UN and EC will be willing to
fight to prove that fact.354
The extension of the self-determination principle to grant
Serbia a loose confederation in Bosnia may misconstrue the
situation. A legal analysis may not be applicable. The sole
reason for the division of Bosnia may well be pragmatism.
Law can be used to describe the deal, but not to explain it.
The strength of the Serbs' position has been reflected in the
negotiations, 355 although not in international law.3 56 Thus,
the success of the Serbs may lie in the strategic strength of
their position and not in their legal rights.
349. See discussion supra part II.C.1.
350. See discussion supra part II.A.3.
351. See discussion supra part II.A.3.
352. See discussion supra part II.A.3; see also supra note 278.
353. See discussion supra parts II.C.1-5.
354. Although Bosnia clearly has international law on its side, it may need
foreign intervention to assert its rights. See generally Cue, supra note 31, at 3;
see also discussion supra parts II.C.1-5.
355. See discussion supra part II.A.3.
356. See discussion supra parts 1I.C.1-5.
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IV. PROPOSAL
The strength of the Serbs' position 357 and the unwilling-
ness of the world community to become far more actively in-
volved in the conflict in Yugoslavia 3 8 suggest that Bosnia
should compromise. As Bosnia is an independent nation, the
UN must grant Bosnia all assurances that its borders are se-
cure. Although Bosnia must respect the right of the Serbs as
a minority group within its territory,359 the UN must assure
Bosnia that the appeasement of the Serbs will not grant the
Serbs an opportunity that they cannot refuse-the creation of
a larger Serbian state. If the Serbian army becomes deeply
involved in the conflict again as a result of concessions to Bos-
nian Serbs that strengthen their position, the UN will have
made the gravest mistake. For as long as the Bosnian Serbs
are separated, albeit artificially, from Serbia, Bosnia has a
chance of survival in something akin to its present dimen-
sions. But if the ICFY eventually gives in to Serbia's abso-
lutely inflexible demand to have a single, autonomous prov-
ince bordering Serbia,36 ° it seems more than likely that the
Serbs will attempt to secede.
Since this resolution would set the dangerous precedent
of factually justifying title to territory by conquest, the win-
dow of opportunity for secession must not be opened.
Although the Serbs will not be happy without being given the
opportunity to secede, there is at least the possibility that the
conflict might end if the opportunity is not given. The Mus-
lims appear to be willing to continue fighting should the
Serbs attempt to make off with part of their country.3 61 In
any case, the rule that title by conquest is no longer valid in
international law, 62 recently enforced in the Gulf War, 63
would be undermined significantly if the Serbs were to have
their way in Bosnia. The borders must remain fixed, for the
conflict will never cease so long as the dividing lines are flexi-
ble. Once the borders are no longer a bargaining chip, the
reasons for continued fighting will slowly subside. If the EC
357. See supra text accompanying note 97.
358. Cue, supra note 31, at 3.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 234-237.
360. See discussion supra part II.A.3.
361. See discussion supra part II.A.3.
362. See discussion supra part II.C.4.
363. See Schachter, supra note 267, at 454.
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and the UN appear to be yielding on the issue, the conflict
will continue. All sides appear quite willing to fight indefi-
nitely to reclaim their desired territory; a war that has no end
in sight must be prevented.
V. CONCLUSION
International law is helpful insofar as it guides the prac-
tice of states. But when ethnic wars begin, international law
can do little more than interpret the process and contemplate
the aftermath. Bosnia can demand adherence to the princi-
ple of territorial integrity and the prohibition against the use
of force, but it remains doubtful that Serbia will suddenly
cave in to the besieged government's desires. The Vance-
Owen Plan left Bosnia open to further strife." 4 Dividing the
country into autonomous enclaves is sure to please no one,
and as long as the Bosnian Serbs believe that they will not be
fighting someone other than Muslims or Croats, they are un-
likely to be swayed. International military action may once
again prove to be the only escape route, placing the region
under a new order's control.
Christian J. Garris
364. See discussion supra part II.A.
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